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COMMENTS

LABOR LAW-SOME DEVELOPMENTS D?JRING THE PAST FIVE
YEARs-(A SERVICE FOR RETURNING VETERANS) *-It will be helpful in appraising labor relations problems of today to recall that unionism in this country has trodden a rough and thorny path over the past
century.1 Unions were not welcomed by employers, worker inertia
itself was a considerable obstacle, and by and large the general public
was dubious as to the value of unionism. Facing these difficulties unions
from the- beginning felt compelled to resort to self-help-the strike,
the picket line, the boycott, etc.-to achieve their aims. In so doing
they encountered vigorous and successful opposition in the courts, as
injured economic interests, and even the government, sought relief.
Judges, responding to the atmosphere of the times, were astute to
find reasons for holding both union objectives and methods unlawful.
E:ffective assistance was found in the application to union activities of
many kinds of statutes, but especially the anti-trust laws. "Rule by
injunction" developed and become commonplace. 2
,
During this struggle, which continued into the present century, the
tide of union membership ebbed and· flowed. Depressions, dissensions
and determined employer and judicial reaction periodically took their

* See note*, p. 889, supra.
1 An excellent brief historical summary of English and American labor law is
contained in LANDIS AND MANOFF, CASES ON LABOR LAw, 2d ed., c. 1 (1942). See also·
BEARD, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MovEMENT (1920); COMMONS
AND ASSOCIATES, HISTORY OF LABOUR IN THE UNITED STATES (1926-1935);.
DAUGHERTY, LABOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, rev. ed. (1938); DONALDSON,
LABOR PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (1939); HARRIS, AMERICAN LABOR (1939);
STEIN AND DAVIS, LABOR P.RoBLEMS IN AMERICA (1940).
2 See FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); also Witte,
"Value of Injunctions in Labor Disputes," 32 J. PoL. EcoN. 335 (1924); Witte,
"Results of Injunctions in Labor Disputes," 12 AM. LAB. LEG. REv. 197 (1922);
FREY, THE LABOR INJUNCTION: AN ExPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT BY JumcIAL CoNscrnNcE AND ITS MENACE (1923); Sayre, "Labor and the Courts," 39 YALE L. J. 682
(1930); Ralston, "Government by Injunction," 5 CoRN. L. Q. 424 (1920); 41
HARV.
REV. 909 (1928}.
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toll. Yet the trend of unionism was upward as unions eventually
gained increasing support for their views and complaints. Even among
the economists the early laissez-faire orthodoxy, which could see no economic basis for unionism, tende9- 1 to give way. 3 The precursor of the
"liberal" judicial approach could be seen in the dissenting opinions of
Justice Holmes who, as a member of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, though convinced that unionism was confronted with the
"iron law of wages," believed nonetheless that workers should be
free to band together to press their common complaints against the
owrrers of the means of production.4 Yet these were minority views.
The official legislative attitude during most of this period was one
of "non-intervention," with the result that the courts remained free
to referee the economic contest in accordance with rules which had been
developed in an atmosphere of intolerance.
The coming of the "New Deal" in the depth of an economic depression of unprecedented magnitude provided the advocates of unionism
with political opportunities of immeasurable value. Enfranchised but
jobless millions, and other millions of "underprivileged," who were
haunted with fear, insecurity and disillusionment, found a ready champion in the President who, through a combination of principle and political opportunism becam,e in reality the head of a labor front government. The country thereupon entered a new political phase, a "laboristic economy," to use the apt expression of Professor Sumner Slichter.
8 Interesting reviews of past and present wage theory may be found in DAUGHERTY,
LABOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1938); SLicHTER, MODERN EcoNOMIC
SocIETY (1928); YoDER, LABOR EcoNOMICS & LABOR PRoBLEM's, 2d ed. (1939);
SLICHTER, THE CHAN.GING CHARACTER OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Am.
Econ. Rev. Supp., vol. 29, no. 1 (1939); SLICHTER, EcoNOMIC CONDITIONS AND CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING, Univ. of Mich. Bureau of lndust. Rel. (1938); and MILLIS AND
MONTGOMERY, LABOR'S PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS, vol. I of THE EcoNOMICS OF
LABOR (1938).
~ "Although this is not the place for extended economic discussion, and although
the law may not always reach ultimate economic conceptions, I think it well to add that
I cherish no illusions as to the meaning and effect of strikes. While I think the strike
a lawful instrument in the universal struggle of life, I think it pure phantasy to suppose
- that there is a_ body of capital of which labor as a whole secures a larger share by that
means. The annual product, subject to an infinitesimal deduction for the luxuries of
the few, is directed to consumption by the multitude, and is consumed by the multitude,
always. Organization and strikes may get a larger share for the members of an organization, but, if they do, they get it at the expense of the less organized and less powerful portion of the laboring mass. They do not create something out of nothing. It is
only by divesting our minds of questions of ownership and other machinery of distribution, and by looking solely at the question of consumption,-asking ourselves what
is the annual product, who consumes it, and what changes would or could we make,that we can keep in the world of realities. But, subject to the qualifications which I
have expressed, I think it lawful for a body of workmen to try by combination to get
more than they now are getting, although they do it at the expense of their fellows,
and to that end to strengthen their union by the boycott and the strike." Holmes, J.,
dissenting in Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492 at 505, 57 N.E. IOII (1900).
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Nothing so significant has happened in the history of the labor movement in this country, and this event provides the clue to the significant
developments in labor law since that date.
Unionism seized the opportunity thus provided, and s_ought a
political solution to some of its problems. There resulted, in 1935, the
National Labor Relations Act,5 the avowed purpose of which was to
build strong, independent unions, and, in 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act,° which introduced the federal government directly into the
business of fixing wage, hour and other labor standards. Of at least
equal importance, a pro-labor administration was able, in due course, to
make a substantial sweep of the federal judiciary.7 Judges were appointed with perhaps more than the usual regard for sympathy with the
political and economic views of the President and his advisers. Similar
considerations, of course, obtained in the appointment of administrative
personnel.
In this setting organized labor grew rapidly in numbers and infl.uence. 8 It was at the height of its power during the war period, a fact
refl.ected by the potency of its infl.uence in connection with the problems
of mobilization, particularly with respect to manpower. Its leaders
patriotically made a no-strike pledge for the duration, but under the
aegis of the National War Labor Board, were able to maintain, if not
accelerate, their rate of progress in dealing with employers.
To this writer was assigned the task of recording some of the developments of labor law during the past five years. These have been
substantial, so much so that any work on labor law antedating 1940 is
almost obsolete. In this comment, which is part of a series designed to
bring returning veterans "up to date," there must necessarily be a
reiteration of much that has been written previously in this and other
law reviews. Because of limitations of space, the treatment here will
have to be both selective and cursory.

A. The Right to Picket as a Civil Liberty
Workers have always been privileged, of course, under the Bill of
Rights to give expression to their views by the ordinary media of publicity. But pamphleteering, the oratory of the meeting hall and the art
6

49 Stat. L. 449 (1935); 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 151 et seq.
52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938); 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 201 et seq.
7
President Roosevelt appointed 7 of the 9 present Supreme Court justices, 25 of
the 51 present circuit court judges, and 108 of the present 181 district court judges.
8
It has been estimated that in 1890 total union membership was 372,000, and
that by 1937 the figure had increased to 7,159,000. See STEIN AND DAVIS, LABOR
PROBLEMS IN AMERICA 253 (1940). Total current membership has been variously
estimated at from 13,000,000 to 15,000,000. For 1944 figures see PETERSON, AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS (1945).
See generally WOLMAN, EBB AND FLOW IN TRADE UNIONISM (1936); WoLMAN,
THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS, 1880-1923 (1924); 4 PERLMAN AND
TAFT, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932 (1935).
6
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of personal communication, while perhaps adequate to the needs of the
: political campaign, have not been deemed sufficient in the sterner economic forum. The pressure of the picket line, usually in support of a
strike, has been considered necessary. Perhaps the most significant development of the past :five years in decisional labor law has been· the
extension by the Supreme Court of the shelter of the Constitution to
some form of picketing.
Thornhill v. Alabama 9 and Carlson v. California,1° decided in I 940
by the reconstructed Court, are the landmark cases which established
this principle. In the former case it was held that an Alabama statute
which prohibited loitering about or picketing business premises for the
purpose of adversely influencing or affecting trade or employment
relations was invalid on its face under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The statute had been applied in .a situation where from six to eight
A.F. of L. members had picketed an employer's premises. There was
no evidence of viofonce.11 The Carlson case involved a Shasta County,
California, ordinance which was substantially similar to the Alabama
statute. -Appellant, who had been convicted under the ordinance, was
one of a group of twenty-nine men who had been engaged in the peace9 310 U.S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940).
Only Justice McReynolds dissented.
Section 3448 of the Alabama State Code of 1923, which was involved in the litigation,
read as follows:
"Section 3448. Loitering or picketing forbidden.-Any person or persons, who,
without a just cause or legal excuse therefor, go near to or loiter about the premises or
place of business of any, other person, firm, corporation, or association of people,
engaged in a fawful business, ~or the purpose, or with the intent of influencing, or inducing other persons not to trade with, buy from, sell to, have business dealingi; with, or
be employed by such persons, firm, corporation, or association, or who picket the works
or place of business of such other persons, firms, corporations, or associations of persons,
for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or interfering with or injuring any lawful business or enterprise of another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; but nothing herein shall
prevent any person from soliciting trade or business for a competitive business."
10 310 U.S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 746 (1940).
11 The situation in the Thornhill case was one in which the union, which had as
members all but four of the approximately one hundred employees of the plant; had
called a strike at the plant. The evidence did not show the 'nature of the dispute giving
rise to the strike action. In a previous case the Alabama Courts had sustained the application of the statute so as to prohibit a single individual from walking slowly and
peacefully back and forth on the public sidewalk in front of the premises of an e!llployer,
without speaking to anyone, and carrying a placard which stated simply that the employer did not employ union men affiliated with the A. F. of L. O'Rourke v. Birmingham, 27 Ala. App. 133, 168 S. 206 (1936), cert. den. 232 Ala. 355, 168 S. 209
(1936). In his opinion, therefore, Justice Murphy declared that "The statute as thus
authoritatively construed and applied leaves room for no exceptions based upon either
the nu1,11ber of persons engaged in the proscribed activity, the peaceful character of their
demeanor, the nature of their dispute with an employer, or the restrained character and
the accurateness of the terminology used in notifying the public of the facts of the
dispute." 310 U.S. 88 at 99, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940).
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ful picketing of a tunnel project, bearing signs stating: "This job is
unfair to CIO." The ordinance was likewise held to be invalid on its
face.
In forbidding the activities covered by the Alabama statute the
state, according to the Court, had proscribed "every practicable, effective means whereby those interested-including the employees directly
affected-may enlighten the public on, the nature and causes of a labor
dispute." 12 That such activities may be effective in producing economic
loss to the employer or to his employees was regarded as immaterial-.
as, in fact, only the natural result of this form of "persuasion."
"Freedom of discussion," said Justice Murphy, "if it would fulfill
its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society
to cope with the exigencies of their period." 13
These decisions produced loud reverberations throughout the legal
world. They were obviously sound if viewea., as they could be, simply
as a repudiation of an attempt to forbid pamphleteering and corn,er
speech-making concerning economic matters. But quite a different aspect was involved if the Court intended to lift ( or perhaps one should
say reduce) picketing as ordinarily understood ( even though a term of
"vague contours" to use Justice Murphy's terminology) to the level of
mere publicity, and thus to give it constitutional sanction.
Heated discussions quickly appeared in the literature.14 Was the
Court aware of the implications of its decisions? The very possibility
of "peaceful" picketing had been. denied by some courts; violent and
mass picketing were commonly thought to be illegal beyond question;
courts which conceded that there could be lawful picketing had solidly
established the rule that all picketing was enjoinable where it had been
so enmeshed in acts of violence or other improprieties that, in the public
mind, it was bound in the future to connote force, though peacefully
conducted; picketing as a means to effectuate secondary boycotts had
been forbidden; and picketing, even though peaceful, had been held illegal where conducted for purposes deemed improper. 15 These general
310 U.S. 88 at 104, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940).
310 U.S. 88 at 102, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940).
14 See c9mments in 39 MICH L. REv. l IO (1940); 28 CAL. L. REv. 733
(1940); 25 MINN. L. REv. 238 (1941). See also Gregory, "Peaceful Picketing and
Freedom of Speech," 26 A.B.A.J. 709 (1940); Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech,"
56 HARV. L. REv. 180 (1942); Dodd, "Picketing and Free Spee(:h: A Dissent,"
56 HARV. L. REv. 513 (1943); Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech: A Reply," 56
HARV. L. REv. 532 (1943); Smith and DeLancey, "The State Legislatures and
Unionism," 38 MICH. L. REv. 987 at 1009 (1940).
15 See Cooper, "The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing," 35 MICH. L. REv. 73
(1936), and, generally, I TELLER, THE LAW GovERNING LABOR DISPUTES AND CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1940).
12

13
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principles had found their way into the Torts Restatement.16 Did
the court intend, at a single stroke, to obliterate a substantial part of
this body of law?
The answer, of course, was not to. be found simply in the Thornhill
decisjon .. It was inevitable that !he Court should be confronted with
cases which would test the scope of the new rule. Two such came to the
Court in quick succession. The first, American Federation of Labor v.
Swing,1 1 the Court took in full stride. Unanimously it was held that
the constitutional privilege extended to a union's attempt, by means of
peaceful picketing, to unionize a beauty parlor, despite the absence of an
employment relationship between the proprietor and the picketers. In
the second case, Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v.
Meadow-moor Dairies,18 the Court foundered on the solid rock of local
interest in the preservation of peace and order. With Justices Black,
Douglas and Reed sharply dissenting, it refused to intervene where the
Illinois Supreme Court had: decided that the picketing there involved
had been so enmeshed with acts of violence that all.possibility of merely
peaceful persuasion was gone, and hence that the trial court had properly enjoined all further picketing.19
The Swing case confirmed that the Thornhill decision did not rest
simply on the point that the use of the printed or spoken word in the
vicinity of an employer's premises cannot be' denied to ,a labor union.
Picketing in the ordinary sense, the use of "human sentinels," is likewise privileged. Moreover, the narrow and unrealistic view as to the
proper "circle of economic competi~ion between employers and workers," at an earlier day used by the Court in the Duplex20 case to delimit
the labor injunction restrictions of the Clayton Act, was rejectea in the
application of the new constitutional doctrine. But the Meadow-moor
case obviously opened to the courts a means of avoiding the rule in
16

Vol. 4, c. 38 (1939).
312 U.S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568 (1941), noted in 54 HARV. L. REV. ro66
(1941)j 90 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 201 (1941); 1942 Wis. L. REv. n5; 29 GEo. L. J.
796 (1941); 15 UNiv. Cm. L. REv. 339 (1941); 19 TEXAS L. REv. 480 (1941).
18
312 U.S. 287, 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941); For comment on this case see 41 CoL.
L. REV. 727 (1941); 54 HARV. L. REV. 1064 (1941); 25 MINN. L. REV. 640
(1941); 8 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 779 (1941).
'
19
Justice Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which, among other things, he disagreed with the majority's analysis of the Illinois Court's decision. In his view "Neither ,
the presence nor the absence of violence was considered by the [Illinois] court to be a
necessary element in its conclusion." 312 U.S. 287 at 305, 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941).
That court, he believed, had in essence decided that, as a matter of policy, it was
"illegal for a labor union to publicize the fact of its belief that a cut-rate business system was injurious to the union and to the public.•.." (Id. at 304.) For this and
other reasons it was his view that the Supreme Court decision in the case was essentially
inconsistent with the Thornhill decision.
'
20
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172 (1921).
17
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situations particularly offensive because of labor's excesses. Thereby the
common law as to violent (non-peaceful) picketing was perhaps left
pretty much intact, save only for the restraining fact that the Supreme
Court has the "ultimate power to search the records in the state courts"
to see that the constitutional guaranty is not defeated by "insubstantial
findings of fact screening reality."
Four other Supreme Court decisions have further delineated the
principle announced in Thornhill's case. Two of these, decided in,1942,
were concerned with the economic area within which the constitutional
privilege may be asserted. In Bakery and Pastry DrivtJrs and Helpers
Local 802 v. Wohl 21 the Court held that the New York anti-injunction
act, as interpreted and apr,lied by the New York courts, infringed the
constitutional rights of a bakery drivers' union, which had been enjoined from peacefully picketing bakeries from which non-union bakery
peddlers purchased their goods. The union had been waging a losing
battle against the increasing use of the peddler system, and had sought
by means of picketing to induce the peddlers to employ union relief
men one day per week. It was the Court's view that the union had used
the only practicable means at hand to make their "legitimate" grievances known to the public "whose patronage was sustaining the peddler
system." But in the Ritter's Cafe 22 case, decided the same day, substance was given to the statement of Justice Jackson, writing for the majority in the Wohl case, that "a state is not required to tolerate in all
places and all circumstances even peaceful picketing by an individual." 28
By a five-tour decision the Court upheld a Texas court decree enjoining secondary picketing as a violation of the state Anti-trust laws.
The facts in this case are important. In furtherance of a dispute between the carpenter's union and a building contractor who employed
non-union labor on a construction job for Ritter, the union had peacefully picketed another wholly independent establishment, a restaurant,
also operated by Ritter. The majority of the Court believed that here,
unlike the situa~ion presented by the Wohl case, there had been a
"conscription of neutrals," which Texas could if it so chose, prohibit.2¼
21

315 U.S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816 (1942).
Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315
U.S. 722, 62 S. Ct. 807 (1942). See the discussion of this line of cases in 40 M1cH.
L. REV. 1200 (1942).
28
Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 at
775, 62 S. Ct. 816 (1942).
24
Said Justice Frankfurter, for the Court: "The line drawn by Texas in this case
is not the line drawn by New York in the Wohl case. The dispute there related to the
conditions under which bakery products were sold and delivered to retailers. The
business of the retailers was therefore directly involved in the dispute. In picketing the
retail establishments the union members would only be following the subject-matter
of their dispute. Here we have a different situation. The dispute concerns the labor
22
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Justices Stone, Roberts and Byrnes, with the maj'ority in this case, have
since been replaced by ;Justices Vinson, Burton and Rutledge. In
view of the obvious difficulty of the decision, in die light of the Wohl
case, and the strongly held views of the dissenting justices, one can
hardly assume with confidence that the limit~ng principle of Ritter's
case (however it should be stated) will be given liberal application. Yet
even the dissenters recognized in their concurring opinion in the Wohl
case ,that "picketing by an organized group is more than free speech ...
since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or
another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being
disseminated," and "hence those aspects of picketing make it the subj ect of restrictive regulation." 25
Two additional decisions remain to be mentioned. 1n1 Cafeteria
Employees Union v. Angelos,2 6 decided in 1943, the Court unanimously struck again at the New York Court of Appeals' current liberality
in upholding labor injunctions. The Court had sustained an injunction
on the theory that no.labor dispute was involved in a situation where
the picketed premi~es were, at the time of suit, operated by a partnersl:tip which, in point of law, was witpout employees. The contention of
defendants that the employer had simply formed a partnership with his
employees in order to be able to make a legal attack on the picketing
was regarded as immaterial. But the Supreme Court held that this
decision could not stand against the Swing case and that the misrepresentation involved in the publitjty used by the picketers was not such as
to justify a swc;:eping injunction. 27
conditions surrounding the construction of a building by a .contractor. Texas has
deemed it desirable to insulate from the dispute an establishment which industrially has
no connection with the dispute. Texas has not attempted t<? protect other business
enterprises of the building contractor, Plaster, who is the petitioners' real adversary.
We need not therefore consider problems that would arise if Texas had undertaken to
draw such a line." Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's
Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 at 727, 62 S. Ct. 807 (1942).
,
25 Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 at
776-777, 62 S. Ct. 816 (1942).
26 320 U.S. 293, 64 S. Ct. 126 (1943).
27 The picketing was at all times orderly and peaceful, but the picketers carried
signs which advertised that the respondents were "unfair" to organized labor and that
the pickets had been previously employed in the cafeteria. Pickets, also told prospective
customers that the cafeteria served bad food, and that by patronizing it they were aid=-ing the cause of fli,sciJm. These representations were treated as false by the New York
courts. The Supreme Court's opinion implied that "continuing representations unquestionably false and acts of coercion going beyond the mere influence exerted by the
fact of picketing" are not constitutionally privileged, and may be restrained, but it
distinguished the "loose language or undefined slogans that are part of the conventional
give-and-take in our economic a·nd political controversies," and evidently considered
such terms as "unfair" and "fascist" as within the area of give-and-take. There is
substantial precedent for this a~titude in pick~ting cases at common law, although a good
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The other case arose out of a foraiy by Mr. R. J. Thomas,· then head
of the militant U.A.W., against an attempt by the State of Texas to
subject union organizing activities to a fairly mild sort of regulation.
Texas enacted a statute requiring professional union organizers to obtain
organizers' cards from the Secretary of State. Thomas proceeded to
Texas for the avowed purpose of violating this statute and thus precipitating a test case. In anticipation the Attorney General of Texas obtained an ex parte order enjoining Thomas from sol!citing memberships
in O.W.I.U. (Oil Workers Industrial Union), a C.I.O. affiliate, withc;:,ut first obtaining an organizer's card. Thomas proceeded to make a
speech at an O.W.I.U. meeting in which he urged Humble Oil's workers to affiliate with O.W.I.U. In addition, he individually solicited one ,
worker. He was thereupon adjudged in contempt, committed and released on bond. In habeas corpus proceedings the Texas Supreme Court
upheld the commitment. But in a five-four decision the United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that Texas had improperly sought to
impose a prior restraint on Thomas's right to make a public speech.28
The case was not concerned with picketing, and from the opinion there
is reason to believe that a professional. union picketer or solicitor could
constitutionally be subjected to the kind of regulation imposed by the
Texas statute.
Four things are obvious from these decisions: (I) Picketing has
been given enough constitutional sanction, so that a constitutional question would appear to be involved whenever a state court issues an order
which restrains picketing; ( 2) picketing is not constitutionally privileged under all circumstances; (3) the law as to picketing must now be
found in the law of the particular state, read in the light of the principles declared by the Supreme Court; ( 4) the Supreme Court in a very
real sense has taken upon itself the task of providing the rules to be
used in refereeing the economic contest between workers and management.
On the merits it does not seem to the writer that the Court's assimilation of picketing to free speech has contributed very helpfully to a
development of sound labor relations, whatever may be said as to the
aptness of the analogy. 29 The substantial problems in connection with
many courts have been inclined to hold picketers to a fairly strict accounting for
language used. See collection of cases in HANDLER, CASES ON LABOR LAW 1 11 ( 1944).
28 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S. Ct. 315 (1945), noted in_ 43 M1cH.
L. REv. 1159 (1945}; 33 CAL. L. REv. 317 (1945); 45 CoL. L. REv. 465 (1945);
33 GEO. L. J. 227 (1945); 14 FORDHAM L. REV. 59 (1945).
29 Even the simple, straightforward picketing situ:ition, of the kind protected in
the Thornhill and Swing cases, seems on analysis to bear little, resemblance to the constitutionally protected public utterance. In each case there may be said to be an appeal
to the public, but, whereas the political orator must ordinarily depend on the persua-
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picketing relate to its use for ends which many consider improper,
and to its unfortunate tendency to transcend standards of fairness, either
by the use of physical force or by its use, as a form of economic coercion
rather than mere persuasion, against third persons as a means of forcing
their alignment against the employer with whom the union is in dispute. It hardly seems constructive to say that picketing for any and all
objectives is now to be beyond restraint simply because courts in the
past have misused t_he "ends-means" test. Unions are no longer in the
"infant industry" stage where they require extraordinary privilege. It
can reasonably be assumed that they are strong enough now to be able
to deal with the forces of reaction wherever they appear. And the
Court's own decisions, in qualifying obscurely the constitutional privilege as to situations involving violence or the attempt to "conscript
neutrals," have simply made it more difficult for the state legislatures,
Congress and the administrative and. judicial agencies to work out clear
definitions of policy with respect to labor problems.
sive quality of what he says to induce conviction, the picketer relies not so much on
what he says as on the symbolic effect of the act of picketing. Of actual utterance or
publication there is very little on the average picket line except of the epithetical variety.
It seems a little al;,surd to.think of the typical "unfair. to organized labor" banner line as
"the disse.mination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute," to use
Justice Murphy's language in the Thornhill opinion.
Insofar as sloganeering of this kind gains results, either by· inducing persons to join
the union, or prospective customers to refrain from patronizing the employer, the
moving force is probably either a predisposition of certain groups to support a union
boycott whenever declared' or the economic or other coercion implicit in the picketing.
Cf. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Ran'ge Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S. Ct. 492 (1911), in
which the Court said that " •.. the agreement to act in concert when the signal is
publjshed, gives the words 'Unfair,' 'We don't patronize,' or similar expressions, a force
not 1nhering in the words themselves...." 221 U.S. 418 at 439, 31 S. Ct. 492
( I 91 I). See also the opinion written by Judge Beatty in Seattle Brewing & Malting
Co. v. Hansen, (C.C. Cal. 1905) 144 F. IOI I. This is not to say that simply because
the effective element of picketing derives from a factor other than an appeal on the
merits, the right to picket should be denied. Unions should, in the opinion of the
writer, be privileged to bring their combined forces to bear against an employer in any
case involving a bona fide labor dispute with such employer. But the rule will rest on
a sounder basis if the question of privilege is resolved after full consideration of the
various social interests involved than if the result is influenced, if not dictated, by
describing picketing as mere speech or public utterance.
So far mention has not been made of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (47 Stat. L. 70,
29 U.S.C. (1940) § IOI et seq.] and its state counterparts which, since 1932, have
operated, on the whole effectually, to restrain the free use of the injunction to restrain
picketing. Speaking generally, these statutes prohibit the use of the injunction against
peaceful picketing in any situation involving a labor dispute. They were pointed toward a legislative solution of the problem of picketing. In a sense the Supreme Court
in i:he Thornhill and associated cases has simply elevated the policy underlying these
statutes to a higher plane and by so doing has forced the policy upon those states which
have not elected to declare it either by statute or by judicial decision.
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In the practical functioning of legal rules it is always interesting to
observe the law "in action" as compared or contrasted with the law as
declared by statute or by the highest court of appeal. On more than one
occasion discrepancies have appeared.80 In the field of labor law there
was reason to assume that the state courts would find it difficult to believe that well established principles could no longer be applied with
impunity. Particularly was this to be expected when the Supreme Court
first declared a new rule, then qualified it in a manner calculated to
leave its scope obscure. A complete survey of lower court decisions has
not been attempted, but the cases cited in the footnote indicate that, at
least in some jurisdictions, the right to engage in peaceful picketing is
not yet treated as absolute. 81
'
B. Unionism and, the Federal Anti-Trust Laws
The year I 940 marks a turning point in the judicial treatment of
the Sherman Act as regards unionism. That year witnessed the early
stages of an almost complete union victory in a long struggle with the
government and employers concerning the applicability of the statute
to the activities of organized labor. At one time many, if not most,
types of coercive labor practices a:ffecting interstate commerce were
thought to be within the act. 82 Today, the careful union can engage in
80 There comes to mind, for example, the reluctance of the federal ~ourts, until
recent years, to give effect to the legislative effort to transfer the fact finding function
in certain areas to various administrative agencies, and, in a different field, to the refusal
of many nisi prius courts, during the severe depression of the 'thirties, to give full effect
to the mortgagee's rights in land foreclosure proceedings.
81 See, for example, Silkworth v. Local No. 575, American Federation of Labor,
309 Mich. 746, 16 N.W. (2d) 145 (1944), where the Court upheld an injunction
prohibiting peaceful picketing for the purpose of compelling the employer to place all
of its drivers in the union by paying their initiation fees. The Court took cognizance of
the constitutional question, but said: "While recognizing the right to picket peacefully
for the purpose of publicizing the facts of a labor dispute . . . we also recognize that
such picketing may become unlawful if directed to the accomplishment of an unlawful
purpose." Id. at 757.
Certain of the earlier New Jersey decisjons showed a disinclination to give full effect to the constitutional doctrine. See Millers, Inc. v. Journeymen Tailors Union, 128
N. J. Eq. 162, 15 A. (2d) 824 (1940); Van Buskirk v. Sign Painters Local No. 1231,
127 N. J. Eq. 533, 14 A. (2d) 45 (1940); Suchodolski v. American Federation of
Labor, 127 N. J. Eq. 511, 14 A. (2d) 5,1 (1940); and Heine's, Inc. v. Truck
Drivers & Helpers' Union, 127 N. J. Eq. 514, 14 A. (2d) 262 (1940). But cf. Lora
Lee Dress Co., Inc. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, 129 N. J. Eq.
368, 19 A. (2d) 659 (1941); and Heine's, Inc. v. Truck Drivers' & Helpers' Union,
129 N. J. Eq. 308, 19 A. (2d) 204 (1941). Mention has been made supra of the
tendency of the New York courts to avoid application of the "free speech" issue by the
simple expedient of disclaiming the existence of a labor dispute.
82 Such renowned cases as Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 28 S. Ct. 301 ( 1908);
Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522, 35 S. Ct. 170 (1915); Duplex Printing Co. v.
Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172 (1921); and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journey-
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such practices without fear of involvement under the act. This has
meant a gain to unions almost equal (i.hdeed, from some .points of
view, exceeding) i1;1 importance the assimilation of picketing to free
speech.
The succession of decisions which have rendered the older cases
largely of historical interest began with Apex Hosiery Company v.
Leader,88 decided in 1940. This was a_ suit by the Apex Company
. against a union and its officers to recover treble damages under the Sherman Act for losses suffered on account of a "sit-down'~ strike at
plaintiff's hosiery manufacturing plant. A, verdict for $237,3 IO damages was obtained and judgment was entered for $7u,932.55. The
circuit court of appeals reversed on the ground that interstate commerce
was .not substantially involved. This decision was affirmed by a divided
Supreme Court, but on the different and portentous ground that the
restraints on commerce inherent in strike action are not within the act
unless they are intended to have, or in fact have, effects on competition
in the form of market control of a commodity which would "monopolize the supply, control its price, or discriminate between its would-be
purchasers."
The opinion of the Court, written by the late Chief Justice Stone,
raised many provocative and vexing questions, which would be worthy
of discussion in any survey of the law in this field but for the startling
men Stone Cutters' Assn., 274 U.S. 37, 47 S. Ct. 52'2 (1927), held the Sherman Act
to be applicable to union boycotts of goods manufactured for distribution in interstate
commerce. Strike or other action aimed directly at the factory or the mine gave the
courts some difficulty because of the established concept that production is not, itself,
commerce. But the Supreme Court in the "second Coronado case" [ Coronado Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 268 U.S. 295, 45 S. Ct. 551 (1925)] held
that there could be .Sherman Act liability in such cases if "the intent of those unlawfully preventing the manufacture or production is shown to be to restrain dr control
the supply entering and moving in interstate commerce, or the price of it in interstate
commerce." See generally BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN AcT (1930); MASoN,
ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE LAw (1925); Emery, "Labor Organiza~ions and the
Sherman Law," 20 J. PoL. EcoN. 599 (1912); Shulman, "Labor and the ,Anti-trust
Laws," 34 lLL. L. REV. 769 (1940); Boudin, "Th~ Sherman Act and Labor Disputes,"
39 CoL. L. REv. 1283 (1939), 40 CoL. L. REv. 14 (1940).
33 310 U.S. 469, 60 S. Ct. 982 (1940), c~mmented upon in 39 MICH. L. REv.
462 (1941). The case provoked heated discussion in the legal periodicals. See Steffen,
"Labor Activities in Restraint of Trade: The Apex Case," 50 YALE L. J. 787 (1941);
Gregory, "Labor's Coercive Activities under the Sherman Act-the Apex Case," 7
UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 347 (1940); Brown, "The Apex C:ise and Its Effect upon Labor
Activities and the Anti-Trust Laws," 21 BosTON UNiv. L. REv. 48 (1941); Gregory,
"The Sherman 'Act v. Labor," 8 UNiv. Cm. L. REv. 222 ( I 941) ; Cavers, "Labor v.
The Sherman Act," 8 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 246 (1941); Landis, "The Apex Case,"
26 CoRN. L. Q. 191 (1941); McLaughlin, "Bottlenecks (Union-Made Included),"
8 UNiv. Cm. L. REv. 215 (1941).
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decision handed down in 1941 in United States 'V. Hutcheson. 84 In that
case t,b.e government, pursuant to Thurman Arnold's carefully considered anti-trust program,8 5 had indicted four officers of the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America under the Sherman
Act as a result of strike and other action taken by the Carpenters' Union
in a jurisdictional fight with the Machinists' Union which involved the
St. Louis plant of Anheuser-Busch, Inc. and the adjacent premises of
one of the company's lessees. The Court, in a now famous opinion by
Justice Frankfurter, affirmed a district court decision sustaining demurrers to the indictment, on the ground that the Sherman, Clayton
and Norris-LaGuardia acts must be read as a "harmonizing text of outlawry of labor conduct," and that the labor conduct there involved· was
not prohibited on such a reading of the statutes.
84 312 U.S. 219, 61 S. Ct. 463 (1941), noted in 29 CAL.' L. REv. 399 (1941);
41 CoL. L. REv. 532 (1941); 54 HARV. L. REv. 887 (1941); 25 MINN. L. REv.
915 (1941); and 89 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 827 (1941). See discussions of the case in
Cavers, "And What of the Apex Case Now," 8 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 516 (1941);
Gregory, "The New Sherman-Clayton-;Norris-LaGuardia Act," 8 UNIV. CHI. L. 1REv.
503 (1941); Nathanson and Wirtz, "The Hutcheson Case: Another View," 36 ILL.
L. REv. 41 (1941); Tunks, "A New Federal Charter for Trade Unionism," 41 CoL.
L. REV. 969 (1941).
85 Assistant Attorney General Arnold's program with respect to labor unions under
the Sherman Act was as follows, as reported in the NEW YORK TIMES, p. 1 (Nov. 20,
1939):
"The anti-trust laws should not be used as an instrument to police strikes or
adjudicate labor controversies. The right of collective bargaining by labor unions is
recognized by the antitrust laws to be a reasonable exercise of collective power. Therefore, we wish to make it clear that it is only such boycotts, strikes, or coercion by labor
unions as have no reasonable connection with wages, hours, health, safety, speed-up
system, or the establishment and maintenance of the right of collective bargaining which
will be prosecuted .•.• The types of unreasonable restraint against which we have recently proceeded or are now proceeding illustrate concretely the practices which in our
opinion are unquestionable violations of the Sherman Act, supported by no responsible
judicial authority whatever.
·
"1. Unreasonable restraints designed to prevent the use of cheaper material,
improved equipment or m'ore efficient methods. An example is the effort to prevent the
installation of factory-glazed windows or factory-painted kitchen cabinets.
"2. Unreasonable restraints designed to compel the hiring of useless and unnecessary labor. An example is the requirement that on each truck entering a city there
be a member of the local teamsters' union in addition to the driver who is already on
the truck. Such unreasonable restraints must be distinguished from ~easonable requirements that a minimum amount of labor be hired in the interests of safety and health or
of avoidance of undue speeding of work.
"3. Unreasonable restraints designed to enforce systems of graft and extortion ••••
"4. Unreasonable restraints designed to enforce illegally fixed prices.•••
"5. Unreasonable restraints designed to destroy an established and legitimate
system of collective bargaining. •Jurisdictional strikes have been condemned by the
A. F. of L. itself. Their purpose is to make war on another union by attacking employers who deal with that union. There is no way the victim of such an attack may
avoid it except by exposing himself to th'e same attack by the other union."
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The case could probably have been disposed of, with the same result, under the principles declared in the Apex case. 86 But the moving
spirits on the Court were evidently determined to write a new charter
of freedom for unionism, regardless of precedent, and in order to do so
engaged in a species of statutory "construction" which came as near as
may be to the actual making of a new anti-trust law ( or more accurately the repeal of an old law) for labor activities. Granting the
underlying premise that unions should be substantially free of Sherman
Act restrictions, the method employed by Justice Frankfurter was a
monument to judicial ingenuity. The reasoning was as follows: The
labor activities in questjon were of the categories expressly immunized
from SJ;ierman Act prosecution under section 20 of the Clayton Act;
even though directed primarily toward settlement of an inter-union
dispute; defendants were not precluded from Jnvoking section 20 because "outsiders to the dispute also shared in .the conduct"; since, with
the broad definition of "labor dispute" contained in the Norris-LaGuardia Act 87 Congress served notice that it disapproved of the narrow
86
This was the basis of Justice Stone's concurring opinion in which l}e pointed out
that the case was essentially one involving local strike and other action against a manufacturer and that there was "no allegation in the case of any of the employers of any
interference, actual or intended, by strikers with goods moving or about to be shipped in
interstate commerce such as was last term so sharply presented and held not to be a
violation of the Sherman.Act in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader.•.." 312 U.S. 219 at
240, 61 S. Ct. 463 (1941).
87
Section 13 of the act [47 Stat. L. 70 at 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 113]
provides as follows: "When used in this Act, and for the purposes of this Act(a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case
involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or
have direct or indirect interests therein; or who are employees of the same employer; or
who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees;
whether such dispute is ( 1) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or associations of employees; (2) between one or more
employers or associations of employers and one or more employers or associations of
employers; or (3) between one or more employees or associations of employees and one
or more employees or associations of employees; or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a 'labor dispute' (as hereinafter defined) of 'persons participating or interested' therein (as hereinafter defined).
·
(b) A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested
in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and if he is engaged in the same
industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein, or is•a member, officer, 'or agent of any association composed in
whole or in part of employers or employees engaged in such industry, trade, craft, or
occupation.
(c) The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee .•.."
An analysis of these provisions will convince they are artfully designed to forestall
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definition of the term earlier declared in the Duplex case which involved the Clayton Act; since, therefore, equitable relief at common
law could not have been obtained in the federal courts, in view of the
restrictions imposed by the Norris Act, "hospitable scope" should be
given to Congressional purpose by rejecting criminal liability under
the Sherman Act.
The decision was essentially negative in its approach. It defined
the kinds of labor activities which are not within the Sherman Act, and
in so doing it drastically recast the law. Union activities are not to be
held within the act simply because they directly involve interstate commerce, as under the traditional view, or even because they are intended
to, or do, in fact, affect prices and markets, as under the test announced
in the Apex case. Whatever their effect on interstate commerce, prices
or markets, they are not to be held within the act if they are taken in
connection with a "labor dispute," as broadly defined in section 13 of
the Norris Act, and if they are within the categories protected by section
20 of the Clayton Act (or, presumably, by section 4 of the Norris Act).
Speaking generally, these categories include all ordinary, non-violent
forms of union action-the strike, picketing, solicitation, the boycott.
Under a strict application of section I 3 of the Norris Act, there is no
room for inquiry into the purposes of union action, as Justice Frankfurter who sponsored that act must have been aware. Hence it followed
from the Hutcheson decision that Mr. Arnold's program for using the
Sherman Act to eradicate "uneconomic" union conduct was rendered
impossible of fulfillment, except, possibly, under a somewhat illogical
qualification suggested by the Justice for the situation where labor
combines with non-labor groups. Except for this suggestion, the area
within which the act might still be permitted to operate was left obscure
by the Hutcheson decision. It was scarcely to be inferred that the
Court, by converse reasoning, would hold that union conduct violates
the Sherman Act in any case where it remains subject to equitable restraint under the Norris Act. Any such holding would mean that
amenability to the Sherman Act would depend primarily on the nature
of the conduct, e.g., whether violent or non-violet, and the act would
become simply a means of "policing interstate commerce," which, according to firmly established doctrine, it was not intended to be. Possibly the answer is that when union conduct, because of its character,
cannot find immunity under the rules announced in the Hutcheson
any possibility that a court, by resort to its own preconceptions as to the nature of a bona
fide labor dispute, will be able to avoid the restrictions of the act. The attempt, however, has not been entirely successful, perhaps because the language of section I 3, taken
literally, really "proves too much." See generally Fraenkel, "Judicial Interpretation
of Labor Laws," 6 UNIV. CH1.- L. REv. 577 (1939); comment, 36 M1cH. L. REv.
II46 (1938); and notes, 28 CAL. L. REv. 353 (1940); 23 CoRN. L. Q. 339 (1938).
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case, the test as 'to liability is to be found in the principles announced in
the Apex case. This, however, would yield the curious result that peaceful conduct aimed directly at price or commodity control is not within
the act, but violent action to the same end is.
The situation in. the electrical equipment industry in the New York
City area soon provided an opportunity to test the scope of the Hutcheson decision. A local of the I.B.E.W., which had jurisdiction only in the
metropolitan New York area, and admitted to membership workers
employed by electrical ·equipment manufacturers and workers employed by electrical contractors, had for years worked toward the usual
union goals of higher wages, shorter hours and enlarged employment
opportunities. Its efforts, through conventional union methods, had resulted in agreements with a steadily increasing number of employers,
which not only were "closed shop" in the usual sense, but alsq obligated
the. employer to deal only with manufacturers or contractors who also
had closed shop agreements with the, Local. These individual agreements were gradually expanded into industry-wide understandings,
"looking not merely to terms and conditions of employment but also
to price and market control." The three groups-manufacturers, contractors and labor--collaborated to police the agreements. As a result,
the business of the local manufacturers had a "phenomenal growth."
Jobs for members of the Local increased, wages went up, hours were
shortened, and the pric~ of locally-produced equipment soared. It was a
most happy situation for all concerned-for all, that is, except consumers who "paid the piper," and producers' outside the New York City
area who found themselves excluded from the New York market.
The plaintiffs in the case were outside manufacturers. They sought
and obtained an injunction prohibiting the Local and certain of its officers from engaging in a wide range of specified activities as in violation
of the Sherman Act. The circuit court of appeals reversed, on the
theory that since the case involved a "labor dispute," and the agreement
grew out of labor action privileged under the Clayton and Norris Acts,
immunity was granted by the rule of the Hutcheson case. The Supreme
Court, however, held otherwise.88 The Court conceded the existence of
a "labor dispute," but concluded that because, and only because, the
Union'had here collaborated with employer groups, it ran afoul of the
Sherman Act. Directions were issued to reinstate the injunction, but in
modified form, so as only to enjoin the prohibited activities when engaged in in combination with a non-labor group. Justice Murphy, dissenting, agreed that if the union had "aided and abetted manufacturers
or traders in violating the act, the union's statutory immunity would
38 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 65 S. Ct. 1533 (1945). See notes in 45 CoL. L. REv. 272
(1945); 58 HARV. L. REv. 273·(1944); 43 M1cH. L. REv. 818 (1945).
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disappear." But, quite realistically, he argued that here the union itself,
had been the moving party, and that it was specious to confuse substance
with form. He evidently felt that no Sherman Act liability should
attach simply because the union, having through immunized conduct
achieved its objective, formalized the result in an understanding which
the industry would have to abide, and would perhaps willingly abide
anyway. 89

Finally should be mentioned the case of Hunt v. Crumboch,4° also
decided in r945. Plaintiff firm had for fourteen years prior to r939
engaged in contract motor truck hauling for the Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Company, principally in interstate commerce. Defendant
A.F. of L. Drivers and Helpers Union in r937 called a strike to enforce the closed shop upon A. & P. truckers and haulers. Plaintiff
refused to accede, much violence occurred in which one of the Union
men was killed, and A. & P. finally yielded, whereupon A. & P. cancelled its contract with plaintiff, at the Union's instigation. Because of
the Union's refusal to admit plaintiff's employees to membership,
plaintiff was unable to obtain any further hauling contracts in Philadelphia. Plaintiff sought an injunction and damages under the Sherman Act, was unsuccessful in the lower courts, and this result was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. "It is not a violation of the Sherman
Act for laborers in combination to refuse to work." 41 The act "does
not purport to afford remedies for all torts committed by or against
persons engaged in interstate commerce." The Apex, Hutcheson and
Allen-Bradley cases were all cited in support of the result. The hoary
principle was reasserted that the Sherman Act was not enacted to provide for the mere policing of interstate commerce.42
This substantial freeing of labor organizations from control under
39 Professor Dodd makes the following comment in his review of the decisions in
"The Supreme Court and Organized Labor, 1941-1945," 58 HARV. L. REv. 1018 at
1051 (1945): "Thus a successful campaign, by a union that controls both the manufacturing and the installing electrical workers in a great city, to build an unsealable
tariff wall around that city, is not illegal by reason of the union's war aims, but only
because of the choice of its allies."
40 325 U.S. 821, 65 S. Ct. 1545 (1945). See note on lower court decision in 43
M1cH L. REv. 636 (1944).
41 325 U.S. 821 at 824, 65 S. Ct. 1545 (1945),
42 Professor Dodd argues that the doctrine of the Hutcheson case, far from supporting the Court's conclusion, has "an exactly opposite tendency." He reasons that the
immunity provided by the rule of the Hutcheson case applies only if there is a "labor
dispute" and that the Court should have found no such dispute to be present in Hunt
v. Crumboch. [Dodd, "The Supreme Court and Organized labor, 1941-1945," 58
HARV. L. REV. IOI 8 at 105 3 ( I 945)]. But this approach is sound only if section 13 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act is to be interpreted otherwise than in accordance with its letter and on the basis of some concept of policy which would be difficult to support in the
light of the history of the act.
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the federal anti-trust laws is, of course, simply an application of the
current "hands-off the union" policy , of , the national government.
Whether this is good or bad policy, it is at least clear that it has not
been dictated by anything explicit in the Sherman or Clayton acts.
The concept that conduct privileged by the Norris Act against injunctive action should carry by implication a privilege against Sherman Act liability in any form has a surface plausibility, but cannot be
said to be supported by any clear indication that Congress so intended.
Had the Court been of a mind to do so, it could as easily have used the
recent grist of cases as a base upon which to construct a rational program
_of federal restriction of certain kinds of union activities which are inconsistent with the notion of a free and developing economy. Such a
program could have left the unions free to achieve every proper
objective, while recognizing that unions are as capable as other groups
of injecting into the economic system rigidities which even the friends
of labor conceive to be harmful to the social interest/~

C. The Labor Relations Acts
We have already cited the National Labor Relations Act of r935
as one of the important labor gains attributable to its effluent political
power. A year previously, important amendments to the Railway Labor
Act of r926 had been ob_tained.44 These statutes have had as their practical objective the development of strong, independent unions, and as
their legal justification the freeing of the channels of commerce from
obstructions due to fabor strife arising out of employer interference
with the development of independent unionism. 45 The federal pattern
43 It is recognized that such an approach by the Court would have involved it in
policy making, and, indeed, in judicial legislation. But so has the course taken by it in
granting unions substantial' immunity. From the beginning the Court has had to add
specification to the generalities of the Sherman Act, and the record of its action in
originating and applying the "rule of reason" to business combinations amply shows that
it has assumed large responsibilities for the development of a federal policy with respect
to restraints upon interstate commerce.
44 48 Stat. L. u85 (1934),, 45 U.S.C. (1940) § 151 et s~q.
45 There is a wealth of literature on the general background and purposes of
these statutes. See, for example, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, LABOR AND THE GovERNMENT (1935); Senate Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); TELLER,
LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1940); RosENFARB, THE NATIONAL
LABOR PoucY AND How IT W oRKS ( 1940); WITTE, GovERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES
(1932); Fahy, "The National Labor Relations Act," 15 IND. L. J. 103 (1939);
Magruder, "A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon the Development of Collective
Bargaining," 50 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (1937); Byrer, "The Railway Labor Act and
the National Labor Relations Act-A Comparison,'' 44 W. VA. L. Q. l (1937); and
Hogan, "The Fifth Decade of Federal Legislation in the Field of Labor Disputes,''
28 GEo. L. J. 343 ·(1939).
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was soon emulated by a number of states.46 General familiarity with
these statutes is assumed.
,
The period under review was one in which the administration and
application of the labor relations acts could be given aggressive attention. Constitutional obstacles had been cleared away by a sympathetic
Court,47 and the way had been paved for delivering the full impact of
the legislation upon the economy. The administrative boards and the
courts have, together, decided thousands of cases involving the acts.
We cannot here review these decisions in detail, or even attempt to
summarize them. We can only indicate some of the more important
or interesting trends and deci~ions.
I. Scope and coverage of the acts
The Railway Labor Act (RLA) 48 is a specialized piece of legislation applying, as the title denotes, to railway and, by amendment, air
carriers operating in interstate commerce. The state acts, of course,
apply within the respective states. The National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) 49 was enacted as an exercise of the commerce power of the
national government, and, by its terms, applies to employers whose
"unfair labor practices" do or might affect interstate commerce.·
, From the beginning the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
has taken a broad position as to the coverage of the ~LRA. It stated in
its First Annual Report that" ... The Board's jurisdiction is coextensive
with congressional power to legislate under the commerce clause of the
constitution ...," and it has proceeded accordingly, receiving, in the
main, ample support from the courts. A series of important Supreme
Court decisions, antedating the period under review here, and beginning with the Jones & Laughlin case,5° laid the foundation for a broad
46
See Smith and DeLancy, "The State Legislatures and Unionism," 38 MICH. L.
REV. 987 (1940).
1
47
Texas & N. 0. Ry. Co. v. Railway & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 50 S. Ct. 427
(1930); Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U,S. 515, 57 S. Ct.
592 (1937); and NLRB v. Jones &Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct.

615 (1937).
48
Originally enacted in 1926 (44 Stat. L. 577) the statute has since been
amended in 1934, as above noted, and again in 1936 (49 Stat. L. 1189). See the historical treatment of the act in TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, LABOR AND THE GoVERNMENT (1935).
49
49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 151 et seq.
Go NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615
(1937). For discussions of this and companion cases see, among others, Chandler, "The
National Labor Relations Act," 22 A.B.A.J. 245 (1936); Fuchs and Freedman, "The
Wagner Act Decisions and Factual Technique in Public Law Cases," 22 WASH. UNiv.
L. Q. 510 (1937); Garrison, "Government and Labor: The Latest Phase," 37 CoL. L.
REv. 897 (1937); Koenig, "The National Labor Relations Act-An Appraisal," 23
CoRN. L. Q. 392 (1938); and Mueller, "Business Subject to the National Labor
Relations Act," 35 MICH. L. REV. 1286 (1937).
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application of the act to the extractive and manufacturing industries, the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and to local industries engaged in performing services for industries subject to the act.
•Jurisdiction has thus been rested on any of the following factors,
or a combination of them: Importation of raw materials from beyond
state lines; sale of finished products to customers in other states;
furnishing of a public µtility or other service or essential commodities .
to concerns engaged in interstate commerce or, to concerns otherwise subject to the act; engaging in interstate transportatioh, or
other forms of interstate commerce in .the traditional sense, and
performing services for or essential to concerns so engaged. In
the Fainblatt case,51 decided-in 1939, the Supreme Court indicated
. that the relative size of the employer's operations is of no consequence.
except where it would be appropriate to apply the maxim "de minimis,"
and in the Bradford Dyeing case 5~ the Court held that the relative importance of the partkular employer's business to the whole of the industry was immaterial. In no case reaching the Supreme Court has the
board's jurisdiction been dehjed, and with relatively few exceptions the
circuit courts of appeals have rejected challenges to the jurisdrction. The
board itself has thus been encouraged to assume that it has pretty much .
a free hand,and it has been astute to find a basis for jurisdiction in all
but a very few cases coming before it.53
Another facet of the problem of scope and coverage of the statutes
arises out of the necessity of determining whether, in a given situation,
the requisite employment relationship exists. The statutes protect
"employees" as against "employers." 54 Employment as understood by
51

NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 59 S. Ct. 668 (1939), noted in 37 MxcH.

L: REV. 1328 (1939).

NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Association, 310 U.S. 318, 60 S. Ct. 918 (1940).
Ample evidence of this fact may be found in the Board's annual reports, in
which if customarily treats the matter of jurisdiction at some length.
54 Section 1, Fifth of the Railway Labor Act contains the following definition:
"Fifth. The term 'employee' as used herein includes every person in the service
of a carrier (subject to its continuing authority to supervise and direct the manner of
rendition of his service) who performs any work defined as that of an employee or
subordinate official in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission now in effect,
and as the. same may b~ amended or interpreted by orders hereafter entered by the
Commission pursuant to the authprity which is hereby conferred upon it to enter
orders amending or interpreting such existing orders: Provided, however, That no occupational classification made by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be
construed to define the crafts according to which railway employees may be organized by
their voluntary action, nor shall the jurisdiction or powers of such employee organiza,tions be regar:ded as in any way limited or defined by the provisions of this Act or by the
orders of the Commission."
·
Section 2 (3) of the National Labor Relation~ Act·provides as follows: "The term
'employee' shall include any employee, ai:id shall not be limited to the employees of a
52

•
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common law tests is, of course, enough, where present. But that neither
the traditional concepts of the law of master and servant nor the peculiar incidents of local statutory law are determinative of coverage under
the NLRA was decided in 1944 in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. 55
Here it was held that newsboys who buy and sell city newspapers as
nominal independent vendors are "employees" within the meaning of
the act where "the economic facts of the relation make it more nearly
one of employment than of independent business enterprise .... "
Perhaps the most significant development in respect of scope and
coverage during recent years has been the treatment of the foreman
question. The problem is to what extent, if af all, superyisory groups
are to be accorded the rights of employees under the acts. It is now
settled by the highest judicial authority that the employer may be
held to account for the conduct of supervisors in answering unfair
labor practice charges under the NLRA even though such conduct
has not been specifically authorized or ratified. 56 On the other hand,
particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained
any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any
lndividual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family
or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse."
55 3.22 U.S. 111, 64 S. Ct. 851 (1944), noted in 57 HARV. L. R'Ev. IIl2
(1944), and 33 KY. L. J. 33 (1945). On,the problem generally in other labor areas
see Seitz, "Rationale for Determining Newsboy and Life Insurance Solicitor Status
Under Unemployment and Workmen's Compensation Statutes," 33 KY. L. J. 102
(1945); Stevens, "The Test of the Employment Relation," 38 M1cH. L. REv. 188
(1940); and Wolfe, "Determination of Employer-Em.ployee Relationships in Social
Legislation," 41 CoL. L. REv. 1015 (1941).
56 "The employer, however, may be held to have assisted the formation of a
union even though the acts of the so-called agents were not expressly authorized or
might not be attributable to him on strict application of the rules of respondeat superior.
We are dealing here not with private rights .•. nor with technical concepts pertinent
to an employer's legal responsibility to third persons for acts of his servants, but with a
clear legislative policy to free the collective bargaining process from all taint of an employer's compulsion, domination, or influence. The existence of that interference must
be determined by careful scrutiny of all the factors, often subtle, which restrain the
employees' choice and for which the employer may fairly be said to be responsible."
Douglas, J. in International Assn. of Machinists, Tool and Die Makers Lodge No. 3 5 v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 at 80, 61 S. Ct. 83 (1940). See also H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB,
311 U.S. 514, 61 S. Ct. 320 (1941). Prior to these decisions the circuit courts "were
not in agreement with respect to the employer's responsibility for the acts of supervisory
employees." HANDLER, CASES ON LABOR LAW 479, note 38 (1944), and cases and
other sources there cited.
·
It would be difficult to hold the employer responsible for the conduct of supervisory employees in many of these labor relations cases on strict agency principles. The
difficulty would vary inversely with the rank of the particular supervisory group in the
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it has been held with some judicial support that at least lower level
supervisors are protected against acts of discrimination under section
8(3) on the ground that they are within the definition of "employee." 57
The next question is w,hether, as employees protected in some respects
under the acts, supervisors have bargaining rights, and, if so, in what
form of bargaining unit.
This question was not crucial in the early years of the NLRB, since,
generally speaking, the unions then active before the board were not
interested in supervisory employees-indeed, usually desired not to
hierarchy. It is common ~nowledge in a large plant that the leadermen, "straw
bosses," and other lower echelon supervisors have very limited authority, and that they,,
in turn, are separated from top management by several intermediate layers of supervision.
In a sense, therefore, employees and others dealing with supervisors, are on notice that
such supervisors may not, in a given situation, be authorized to act or speak for management. Then, if evidence of express authorization or ratification is absent the employer
may with some force say that his responsibility has not been established.
But the cases do not usually lend themselves to such simple analysis. In the
typical case the board has not relied on a single act of supervisory interference, but on a
series of acts, by more than one supervisor, such as to suggest a pattern or policy in the
plant. Moreover, the ordinary employee can scarcely be- expected to investigate the
authority of his immediate boss to act or speak. If, under the circumstances, it is reasonable to. find that the employee regarded his superior as speaking or acting for the
employer in the matter of unionism, the effect on the employee is precisely the same as
though the employer had ordered the supervisor's conduct. It is not unreasonable in this
situation to require the employer to take affirmative action to prevent a recurrence of
such supervisory conduct in the future. If lower rank supervisors, themselves, become
unionized in a given plant, however, it would seem to be less reasonable to hold employees justified in assuming that, when such supervisors speak their minds with respect
to a particular union, they are speaking for management.
Insofar as employer responsibility in these cases rests on power to prevent the
course of conduct, or on the impropriety of benefiting from it, the employer is now denied the protection of a similar rule in the federal courts in dealing with the union
whose members are engaged in improper strike, picketing or other action. The NorrisLaGuardia Act provides that "No officer or member of any association or organization,
and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be
held responsible or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or
actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge
therefore." 47 Stat. L. 70 at 71, 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 106.
57 "A foreman, in his relation to his employer, is an employee, while in his
relation to the laborers under him he is _the representative of the employer and within
the definition of section 2(2) of the Act. Nothing in the Act excepts foremen from
its benefits nor from protection against discrimination nor unfair labor practices of the
master." Judge Thomas, writing for the Court in NLRB v. Skinner & Kennedy
Stationery Co., (C.C.A. 8th, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 667 at 671. See also Matter of Soss
Mfg. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 348 (1944); and Matter of Packard Motor Car Company, 61
N.L.R.B. 4 (1945), and cases there cited to this point. It should be noted that any
person who is a "sub01:dinate official," as defined by the, Interstate Commerce Commission, is expressly within the definition of "employee" as contained in the Railway
Labor Act. See the definition, supra, note 54.
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represent them. Hence, they were as a rule excluded from bargaining
units of non-supervisory employees as a matter of course. This process
left them substantially shorn of the benefits of the act, and it was not
long before the board was presented with a demand by supervisors for
separate recognition under section 9(b). In the Union Collieries 58 and
Godchaux Sugars 50 cases, each decided in 1942, a board majority consisting of .Chairman Millis and Member Leiserson, with Member
Reilly dissenting, rather easily concluded that they were entitled to
such recognition. 60
By May, 1943, there had been a change of board membership, and
in the Maryland Dry dock 61 case Member Reilly was able to gain the
support of the new incumbent, Mr. Houston, and "reexamine the legal
premise" of the previous decisions. The result was to rule that supervisory employees, even though "employees" within the definition in
the act, may not constitute appropriate bargaining units. 62 So matters
58

Matter of Union Collieries Coal Company, 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942).
Matter of Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 874 (1942).
60
In these cases a line was drawn among levels of supervision. In the Union
Collieries case assistant mine foremen, weigh bosses, fire bosses and coal inspectors were
included in the bargaining unit, while night bosses and mine foremen, each of whom
had supervision over one or more of the foregoing categories, were excluded. The
board's policy may be gathered from these remarks in its opinion: "The unit urged
here consists only of supervisory employees, who, with the exception of the night bosses,
are employed in supervisory positions of minor importance. None participates in determining the policy of the Company or has power to hire or discharge. They have
very slight disciplinary power over employees under their supervision and in some cases
no disciplinary power. All are paid on a daily basis. Their powers, duties, and interests
are such that all these employees, except the night bosses, have that community of interest which is prerequisite to inclusion within a single unit." Id. at 967. In the
Godchaux Sugars case working and non-working foremen, excluding the general foreman of the warehouse and shipping department, were included in the unit.
61
Matter of The Marylanq Drydock Company, 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943).
62
The decision was the more significant because the employees involved were
leadermen, a bottom level supervisory group. The rationale of the decision was that,
regardless of the definition of "employee" in the act, the Congressional intention was to
leave to the board the determination of appropriate bargaining units, and that " ... in
the present stage of industrial administration and employee self-organization, the
establishment of bargaining units composed of supervisors exercising substantial managerial authority will impede the processes of collective bargaining, disrupt established
managerial and production techniques, and militate against effectuation of the policies
of the Act." 49 N.L.R.B. 733 at 741 (1943). Chairman Millis wrote a vigorous dissenting opinion, in which he protested that the earlier decisions h;id not been based
solely on the premise that supervisors are included within the definition of "employee"
in the act, but also on grounds of statutory policy, which he proceeded to outline at
length. The opinion of the majority recognized that the practice in various craft
unions, "notably in the printing and maritime trades," has been to represent foremen
and to bargain for them. The opinion disclaimed any inten,tion "to disrupt the rights
which such supervisors may have obtained under collective agreements." 49 N.L.R.B.
733 at 740 (1943).
59
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stood until, in the Packard Motor case,03 in March, 1945, the problem
was re-reviewed, and a board majority consisting of Members Millis
and Houston held that Packard foremen constituted an appropriate
bargaining unit and should be given the opportunity to vote for representation by the Foreman's Association of America, an independent
union. Finally, in the Jones & Laughlin case,04 a year later, the cycle
was rounded out and it was held that supervisory employees could be
represented by a union which was affiliated with another union represedting production employees. The board thus returned to the position
which it had originally taken in the Godchaux Sugars case in 1942.
The principles thus declared have yet to be fully tested in the,
courts. They do not mean that all supervisory employees are to be accorded the rights of "employees" under the act. At some point in the
hierarchy a line must necessarily be drawn above which persons employed by the employing entity will be considered solely as part of
management for labor rel;i.tions purposes. Below this point, according
to the board's present philosophy, persons may be representatives of
management for some labor relations purposes, yet be entitled to collective bargaining and associated rights in dealing with their superiors
as to their own terms and conditions of employment.
This position clearly presents difficulties to management. It means
a far less secure control of the lower echelons of supervisory employees,
and, if they are to be allowed to affiliate with non-supervisory employees, an alignment of their interests with the workers rather than
with the management. There is much to be said for the position that at
least they should not be allowed, to join unions affiliated with unions
representing non-supervisory groups. But 'it does not seem to this
writer to be either improper under the act or necessarily devastating to
plant labor relations to hold that lower tier "supervisors" should be
permitted to deal as a group with the management in respect of their
own employment situation. This would seem to be a predictable consequence of the attenuation of the authority granted to lower rank
supervisors in large scale operations, the decrease in pay di:fferentials in
their favor, the loss of close personal relationship with the management,
1
and the insecurity of their position.
63 Matter of Packard Motor Car Company, 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945). The board
found that all general foremen, foremen, assistant foremen, and special assignment
men employed by the Company at ~ts plants in Detroit, Michigan, constituted a unit •
appropriate for collective bargaining purposes. It was now Mr. Reilly's turn to write a
dissen't:ing opinion, which he began with the positive assertion that " . . . the decision
we are making today does irreparable damage to the delicate balance between the conflicting 'interests of management and worker which the National Labor Relations Act
sought to bring about in American industry." Id. at 27.
64 Matter of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 17 L.R.R. 971 (March 7, 1946).
Member Reilly, of course, dissented.
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Unfair employer labor practices
The labor relations acts seek to achieve their development of
strong, independent unionism by granting employees the right, free of
employer restraint, to join unions and to bargain collectively. The
NLRA and its state counterparts denominate proscribed .employer conduct as "unfair labor practices." The RLA, without using this nomenclature, covers essentially the same ground. Again, familiarity with the
legislative pattern and with the general principles which have been
developed in the administration of the acts is assumed. Only certain of
the more significant or interesting developments of the past five years
will be mentioned here.
a. Interference: general. Section 8(1) of 'the NLRA, and its
counterpart in the RLA and the state acts, make unlawful in general
terms employer acts which interfere with freedom of the employee to
affiliate with labor organizations and to bargain collectively. 65 It is
obvious that a very wide range of activities may come within these
provisions, and so it has been held. 06 The cruder forms of anti-union
conduct had largely given way, even before the NLRA'was adopted,
to more subtle anti-union tactics. Of late the agencies and the courts
have been increasingly concerned with these, and with certain refinements in the detailed application of the principle of non-interference.
Thus, early in the period under review the Supreme Court in National
Licorice Co. v. NLRB 61 repudiated an effort to devise a form of individual employee contract which, the Court felt, was calculated to
2.

65 Section 8 (I) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 7." Section 7 provides that "Employees shall 'have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 49 Stat. L. 449 at 452
(1935), 29 u.s.c. (1940) §§ 157, 158 (1).
66 The annual reports of the NLRB are a valuable source of information as to
practices which have been found to be unlawful under section 8 (I). See especially the
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, 51-65 (1938).
67 309 U.S. 350, 60 S. Ct. 569 (1940). See Hoeniger, "The Individual Employment Contract under the Wagner Act," IO FORDHAM L. REV. 14, 389 (1941);
and 40 CoL. L. REv. 278 (1940). The individual employment contracts in question
relinquished the right to strike, the right to demand a closed shop and the right to have
a signed union agreement. The agreement also conta_ined provisions for arbitration as
to wage rates and working hours, but provided that the "question as to the propriety of
an employee's discharge is in no event to be one for arbitration or mediation." The
Court regarded the~e individual commitments as inconsistent with, and as a renunciation of, the right of collective bargaining, which was clearly correct insofar as they
took the form of individual agreements to refrain from collective action. The contracts were known as the "Balleisen formula," since they were reputed to have been
devised by one L. L. Balleisen, Industrial Secretary of the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce.
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deprive employees of rights secured to them under the NLRA. Of
interest also is the 1945 ruling of the Cou.rt in two cases upholding
NLRB decisions that shop rules prohibiting union solicitation of employees on company time during non-working hours constituted an
improper interference with the right of self-organization of employees,
where the rules were not found to be necessary for reasons of plant
production or discipline. 68
Perhaps the most noteworthy development in the application of the
general prohibitions of the statutes has been with respect to the right of
the employer to mak~ anti-uriion statements. From the beginning the
NLRB has taken the position that employer statements which are
"coercive" are unfair labor practices, and beyond the protectfon of the
First Amendment. 69 A coercive effect was found to exist in practically
every insta.qce, either due to the nature of the statements, themselves,
or where made in a context of other anti--qnion acts. The underlying
premise was that almost any expressi9n of opinion of unionism by the
employer, or by those representing him, was bound to have an intimidating effect because of the peculiar position of economic dominance
held by the employer vis-a-vis the employee. And some support for
this view is to be found in early lower court decisions. 70
68

Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB; NLRB v. Le Tourneau Company o:f Georgia, 324 U.S. 793, 65 S. Ct. 982 (1945), noted in 13 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 494
(-1945), and 5 LAw GUILD REv. 253 (1945).
69
See, for example, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BoARD THIRD ANNUAL REPORT
59-62. ( l 93 8). Unfair labor practice charges were sustained in cases running the
gamut from the use of employer invective ( descriptions of union organizers as "racketeers," "parasites," "thugs and highwaymen," "cutthroats" and "reds") to simple and
plausible employer statements of employee rights. Illustrative of the latter and ob..:
viously more difficult type of case is NLRB v. Elkland Leather Co., (C.C.A.- 3d,
1940) II4 F. (2d) 221. At the height of an active campaign to organize its workers,
the company handed each employee a printed statement reading as follows:
"You are under no obligation to join any union and cannot be forced to do so as
this tannery will always operate as an open shop.
"This company will deal individually with any employee that wishes to do so at
any time."
The board said as to this: "This declaration of intention was manifestly designed to
discourage organizational efforts. It has been our ~xperience that such statements of
policy are ordinarily made by employers who are hostile towards unions and who seek
to avoid dealing with them in any manner." 8 N.L.R.B. 519 at 534 (1938). The
Board had also found that signatures to petitions expressing a preference for a local
organization were solicited within the plant with the acquiesence and support of the
Company's supervisory employees, so that, as usual, it did not have to consider the
legality of the employer's statements apart from an anti-union context.
70
See, for example, NLRB v. Falk Corporation, (C.C.A. 7th, 1939) 102 F.
(2d) 383, in which Judge Evans, speaking for the court, said: "On the other hand,
the position of the employer 'is a most delicate one. Surely, he has the right to his
views. And the right to entertain views is rather valueless if it be not accompanied
by the right to express them. And this right to express his views is clearer when they
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The period under review has witnessed a rather half-hearted effort
by the Supreme Court to circumscribe the board in its somewhat cavalier treatment of this problem. In the Virginia Electric & Power Co.
case 71 the board had found that the company in posting certain bulletins
and sponsoring certain speeches to employees by company officials had
violated the act. The Court directed a remand of the case to the board.
Its view was that "Neither the Act nor the Board's order here enjoins
the employer from expressing its view on labor policies or problems ..." but that "conduct, though evidenced in part by speech, may
amount in connection with other circumstances to coercion within the
meaning of the Act." 72 Here the main charge was company domination
of an independent union, and there was evidence of a history of antiunionism as manifested by specific acts. If, according to the Court, the
employer's utterances were considered apart from such background, it
would be "difficult to sustain a finding of coercion •with respect to them
alone," but if the board could, in reliance upon "a complex of activities," raise them "to the stature of coercion," the matter might be different.
After the remand the board proceeded, in the light of Justice Murphy's opinion, to reconsider the case.78 It came through with the same
conclusion as to domination of the independent union, but, while still
stressing the bulletin and the speeches, considered them "not in isolation but as part of a pattern of events adding up to the conclusion of
domination and interference." It nevertheless found that, as integral
parts of such pattern of events, they restrained and coerced employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 of the act. This time
its order, which, insofar as section 8 (I) was concerned, was the same as
are expressed in response to an interrogatory by one of his employees. And yet, the
voice of authority may, by tone inflection, as well as by the substance of the words
uttered, provoke fear and awe quite as readily as it ,may bespeak fatherly advice. The position of the employer where, as here, there is present genuine and sincere respect and
regard, carries such weight and influence that his words may be coercive when they
would not be so if the relation of master and servant did not exist." (Id. at 389.) See
also NLRB v. Elkland Leather Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 221; OwensIllinois Glass Co. v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 6th, 1941) 123 F. (2d) 670; and NLRB v.
Luxuray, Inc., (C.C.A. 2d, 1941) 123 F. (2d) 106. But cf. Jefferson Electric Co. v.
NLRB, (C.C.A. 7th, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 949; and NLRB v. Ford Motor Co.,
(C.C.A. 6th, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 905.
71
314 U.S. 469, 62 S. Ct. 344 (1941), noted in 42 CoL. L. REv. 862 (1942),
and 30 GEo. L. J. 642 (1942). The general problem is discussed in Van Dusen,
"Freedom of Speech and the National Labor Relations Act," 35 ILL. L. REv. 409
(1940); and Killingsworth, "Employer Freedom of Speech and the N.L.R.B.," 1941
Wis. L. REv. 211.
72
314 U.S. 469 at 477, 62 S. Ct. 344 (1941).
78
NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 40 N.L.R.B. 297 (1942).
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before, and couched in general terms, was upheld by the circuit court 74
and was not challenged as to this point in the Supreme Court.75
~
The unhappy cynic might be inclined to say that the only effect of
the Court's foray into the field in this case was to provide instruction to
the board as to the manner in which it should write its findings when the
issue of free speech is involved. The Electric- Company probably has
felt constrained, as d result of the case, to withhold publicizing its views
with respect to outside unionism, although it· could perhaps contend
that, once the dominated union had been disestablished, and other
unfair labor practices terminated, any future statements which it might
make concerning unionism would be disassociated from any pattern of
anti-union action and would therefore not be within the prohibitions of
the board's order or of the act. The decision has been taken to mean,
however, that the board may not legally predicate a cease and desist
order simply on isolated employer expressions of view unless they are
per se coercive. The employer's position of economic dominance should
not of itself under this view be held to import an illegally· coercive ,
quality to his statements, even though their tenor is anti-union.
b. Dom"ination of labor orgtJ,nizations. Section 8 (2) of the NLRA,
and its counterparts in the RLA and in state legislation, make it unlawful for the employer to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of, or to give financial or other support to, any labo.r
organization. This is the legislative answer to the problem of the
"company union," which has been a major impediment to the development o,f independent unionism ever since Bethlehem Steel, on the advice of Mr. MacKenzie King, introduced in this country the "Plan of
Employees Representation." 76 Apart from the inevitable questions of
fact which must arise in determining whether the illicit employer-union
relationship exists in a given case, the problems most frequently recur~
ring have had to do with the remedy to ·be provided once the fact has
been found.
The usual remedy, except where the assisted union happens to be
accredited by affiliation with ~ recognized :union such as the A.F. of L.
or the C.I.O., is an order of cease and desist and that the union be
"disestablished" as bargaining representative, a form of redress first
74

NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Po'wer Co., (C.C.A; 4th, 1942) 132 F (2d)

390.
Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 63 S. Ct. 1214
(1943). 1
76 For a good discussion of the history of company unionism see TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND, LABOR AND THE GovERNMENT ( I 93 5). Se·e also Daykin, "The
Status of Company-Dominated Unions Under the NLRA," 29 GEo. L. J. 699
(1941➔•
75
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given Supreme Court approval in a case decided under the RLA. 77
When the dominated union, following such an order, is reorganized, or
is dissolved and is succeeded by another non-affiliated union, and the
reorganized or new union, having majority employee support, demands
recognition, the question arises whether the employer is free to deal
with it if he abstains from the practices which tainted his relations with
the original union. The answer might seem obviously to be in the
affirmative; but under the decisions this situation is suspect and will be
scrutinized with a wary eye.
In Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB 78 the
circuit court supported the board's order that· the successor union
should also be disestablished. The board's theory was that. the com- .
parry had not sufficiently removed itself from the picture, and that the
new union had succeeded to the position of the former union without
any substantial line of fracture. This conclusion w:as bolstered somewhat by evidence of discrimination against the C.I.O., which was attempting to organize the plant. A similar result was reached in
NLRB v. Southertt Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. 79 despite the
fact that for a period of five years following acts of employer disassociation with an admittedly company dominated union, and its reorganization, the successor organization had a record of active bargaining with
the company during which it was able to obtain very substantial wage
and other concessions.
How much, if anything, more is necessary than a clear and open disavowal by the employer of any intention to support a dominated union,
plus a refusal of further recognition of such union, is not clear from the
cases. Apparently, however, there must as a practical matter be a dissolution as well as disestablishment of the dominated union, and a sufficient hiatus must follow to give employees an opportunity for a free and
uninfluenced choice of a new bargaining representative. The recent history of company (unaffiliated) unionism does not suggest that it can
thrive without active employer support, at least in the face of competition from affiliated unions. It seems clear that the era of company
unions has ended, a circumstance not to be deplored if one accepts the
inevitability and desirability of free and strong unipnism in this country.
77 Texas &·New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks,
281 U.S. 548, 50 S. Ct. 427 (1930).
78 (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) 112 F. (2d) 657, affirmed per curiam, 312 U.S. 660, 6r
S. Ct. 736 (1941). Cf., among other cases, NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Company, 308 U.S. 241, 60 S. Ct, 203 (1939). NLRB v. Continental
Oil Co., (C.C.A. 10th, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 120; Cudahy Packing Co. v. NLRB,
(C.C.A. 10th, 1941) 118 F. (2d) 295; NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., (C.C.A. 2d,
1943) 138 F. (2d) 885.
70 319 U.S. 50, 63 S. Ct. 905 (1943).
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c. Discrimination. Section 8 (3) of the NLRA prohibits "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization." 80 The RLA and the state statutes contain like
provisions. An interesting and important development in the application of the NLRA provision occurred in 1941 in Phelps Dodge CorPriration v. NLRB, 81 wherein it was held that the duty of non-discrimination applies at the hiring stage as well as thereafter. The decision was clearly proper, as all of the participating justices agreed. If an
employer could "stack the cards" by rejecting all applicants for employment having union sympathies, the purposes of the act could not well
be achieved. The only real problem in the case was whether, given a
case of discriminatory refusal to hire, the board had power not only to
forbid similar action in the future, but also to require the employer to
give employment to those who had been rejected. The difficulty arose
out of the fact that section ro( c) of the act, which provides the authority for affirmative orders, makes reference only to "reinstatement" of
"employees." Two of the justices were unable to find in the statute any
authority to force the employer to take on persons who had not had
the status of employees.
·
The proviso of section 8 (3) sanctioning the closed shop 82-which,
incidentally, is not, present in the Railway Labor Act, and is subject to
substantial qualification in some of the state acts 83-was bound to pre49 Stat. L.· 449 at 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 158 (3).
313 U.S. 177, 61 S. Ct. 845 (1941), noted, 39 M1cH. L. REv. 1431 (1941).
See the discussion of the case in Feinberg, "Reinstatement and Back Pay-The Phelps
Dodge Case," 42 CoL. L. REv. 443 (1942).
82 " • • • Provided, That nothing in this Act or in the National Industrial Recovery
Act (U.S.C., Supp. VII, title 15, secs. 701-712), as amended from time to time, or in
any code or agreement approved or prescribed thereunder, or in any other statute of
the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this Act
as an unfair labor practice) to require as a coifdition of employment membership
therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as- provided
in section 9 (a), in the appropriate collective bargaining unit' covered by such agreement
when made." 49 Stat. 449 at 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 158 (3).
,
83 The Colorado State Peace Act (Acts 1943, c. 131, §§ 24 et seq.), Section 6
(1) (c) sanctions the closed shop only if three-fourths of the employees in the unit have
voted for it in a secret ballot conducted by the Industrial Commission. The Wisconsin
Employment Peace Act [Laws (1937) c. 57], Section .111.06 (1) (c) contains a similar requirement of employee approval (two-thirds of those voting, those voting to
constitute at least a majority), and adds that the Board may terminate any such agreement upon finding that the union has "unreasonably refused to receive as a member
any employee of such employer." The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act [Pa. Laws
(1937) No. 294, as amended by Pa. Laws (1939) No. 162, 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1941) §§ 211.1-211.13], Section 6 (1) (c) .requires only that membership in
the union be open to employees employed at the time the agreement becomes effective.
so
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sent problems because of its obvious inconsistency with the policy favoring complete freedom of choice on the part of the individual employee.
It suggests, for one thing, that there should be no real objection to employer favoritism in support of a union which has independently acquired bargaining rights under the act. But in NLRB v. Electric
Vacuum Cleaner Co.,84 decided in r942, the Supreme Court held that,
until a closed shop contract has been made, the employer may not
cooperate with or otherwise assist_ the union in obtaining members. The
employer must follow a "hands off" policy unless ·he is willing to go
sled length and grant a closed shop. The decision emphasizes a point
sometimes overlooked, namely, that encouragement as well as discouragement of unionism is forbidden.
The essential conflict in policy between the closed shop proviso and
the general provisions of the NLRA has presented other difficulties.
Under the ordinary closed shop agreement the individual is required to
maintain his membership in the union in good standing at the risk of job
forfeiture for failure to do so. So far as the letter of the statute is concerned, "good standing" is for the union to determine. Congress did
not concern itself with this matter. From the point of view of the union
good standing may involve something more than mere payment of
dues. It may, for example, require complete loyalty, so that, if, during
the life of the contract, a union member becomes active in support of
rival union, he may be persona non grata; similarly, if, before the union
was certified, he was one of a rival group.
The board has had to face the question whether closed shop contracts may properly be used to force the discharge of employees
under these and similar circumstances. The result has been- a series of
cases, beginning in r 943, in which has been evolved the principle that
,the closed shop contract may not be "misused," and in which discharges
have been held to be violations of section 8 ( 3) of the act. So in Matter
of Rutland Court Owners, lnc.,85 the board held that employees had
been improperly discharged because towards the end of the period of a
valid closed shop contract they lost good standing by designating another union as their bargaining agent for the period which was to follow. And in "Matter of Wallace Corporation,8° where the company
agreed that it would grant a closed shop contract to the union which
should win a consent election, it was held to have violated the act in
discharging certain employees who had supported the losing union and
who were refused membership in the winning union. The board
seemed to rely especially in this case on the fact that the employer
84

315 U.S. 685, 62 S. Ct. 846 (1942).
44 N.L.R.B. 587 (1942).
86
50 N.L.R.B. 138 (1943).
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knew, before signing the closed---shop agreement, that these discharges
would be requested.
. The decision in the Wallace case reached the Supreme Court and
was there sustained in a five-four decision.87 The gist of the majority's
reasoning was that Congress did not intend to perll!it the· closed shop
proviso to be used by a majority in cooperation with the employer to
penalize minority groups. The ans~er of the dissenting justices, of
course, was that the employer, at least, should not be penalized for
doing. precisely what the act by its terms authorizes. These and other
cases have now enshrouded the closed shop provision in considerable
uncertainty. The fault lies with Congress in failing to require explicitly
that union security provisions should be attended by safeguards in the
form of reasonable membership rules, and to specify clear standards by
which to judge such rules. Both employers and unions are entitled to
ask that the ~ituatio.q be clarified by legislative action.
d. The duty to bargain collectively. All of the labor relations acts
- postulate collective bargaining as th~ great desideratum, on the basis
of which sound industrial peace is finally to be achieved. ·The legal
duty to bargain received early and vigorous attention
the part of the
agencies and the courts, as a result of which the nature of the obligation, and the roµtine required mechanics of the bargaining process were
fairly clearly elucidated prior to 1940.88 The period since, however, has
brought forward some__ interesting problems in the refinement of the
obligation.
One of, these is with respect to "grievances,",and the manner of
their treatment. In industry parlance the term "grievances" refers to
cpmplaints made as to the interpretation or application of a collective
agreement, as distinguished from issues presented- in connection with
the original negotiation of the agreement. The NLRA reserves to employees the right to present their grievances directly 'to management, ,
by way of qualification of the duty imposed on the employer to deal
exclusively with the bargaining agent. 89 The RLA provides that

on

'
!17 Wallace Corporation v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 65 S. Ct. 238 (1944), noted
43 MicH. L. REv. 819 (1945). More recently the principle was 'applied in Matter
of Cliffs Dow Chemical Co., 17 L.R.R. 582 (1946), which was somewhat similar on its
facts to the Rutland Court Owners case.
88 See Ward, "The Mechanics of Collective Bargaining," 53 HARV. L. REV.
754 ( 1940) ; Daykin, "Social and Legal Implications of Collective Bargaining under
the National Labo~ Relations Act," 21 BosToN UNiv. L. REv. 212 (1941); Feinberg,
"The Process of Collective Bargaining," IO BROOKLYN L. REv. 257 (1941); Latham,
"Federal Regulation of Collective Bargaining," 6 GEo. WASH. L. REv. I (1937); and
Smith, "The Evolution of the 'Duty to Bargain' ~oncept in American Law," 39 MICH.
L. REV; 1065 (1941).
89 "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
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grievances shall be handled "in the u~ual manner" within the company,
and provides for ultimate appeal by either party to the dispute to a
special statutory tribunal. 90 Is the employer by virtue of these provisions freed of any obligation to deal with the bargaining agent whenever an individual employee chooses to by-pass the union? Does the
individual employee have a statutory right to deal directly with the
employer, or may the ~mployer, if he is willing, agree with the union
on an exclusive union grievance procedure? The answers are not clear
from the statutes.111
The problem arises, no doubt, from a failure on the part of Congress
to appreciate the nature of collective bargaining, which involves more
than the original negotiation of the contract. The NLRB is clearly
right in its view that the collective interest is involved in ·the day to
day administration of the agreement. This interest can be safeguarded
only if the union has an opportunity to participate in the settlement of
I

exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of
employment: Prooided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer." [Section 9(a),
NLRA, 49 Stat. L. 449 at 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 159 {a)].
90 "The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or
carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpi;etation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions .•• shall be handled in the
usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated
to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the dispute
may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division
of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data
bearing upon the disputes." [RLA, § 3 {i), 48 Stat. L. r185 at 1191 (1934), 45 ,
u.s.c. (1940) § 133 (i)].
"Parties may be he.ard either in person, by aounsel, or by other representatives, as
they may respectively elect, and the several divisions of the Adjustment Board shall
give due notice of all hearings to the employee or employees and the carrier or carriers
involved in any disputes submitted to them." [RLA, Section 3 (j), 48 Stat. L. I I 8 5
at 119~ (1934), 45 U.S.C. (1940) § 153 (j) ].
Under the act the Adjustment Board has power to decide the controversy and issue
an aw,ard which, if favorable to the aggrieved employee, becomes "prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated." See generally SPENCER, THE NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BoARD, Vol. 8, no. 3 of Studies in Business Administration, School of
Business, Univ. of Chicago (1938); and Garrison, "The National Railroad Adjustment
Board, a Unique Administrative Agency,"-46 YALE L. J. 567 (1937).
91 These questions arise more clearly under the NilRA than under the RLA.
The language of the RLA is such as to admit of a distinction between the intraplant grievance procedure and the ultimate right to enforce the contract by special action
before the Adjustment Board or by litigation. Thus, it could be held that the statute,
in requiring that grievances shall be handled "in the usual manner" within the plant,
in effect gives the aggrieved employee no alternative except to use the union grievance
procedure if this is the customary or contractually stipulated method. But at the appellate stage the individual employee may, under a permissible reading of the statute,
have a right to proi;_eed without union representation.
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grievances. Circuit court of appeals decisions as to the relative rights of
employee, union and employer in this matter are in conflict, however, as
might be supposed. 92 The recent decision of the Supreme Court in the
Elgin93 case, arising under the RLA, appears to deny the right of the
employer and the union to exclude the individual employee from the
grievance settlement process. Yet there is more than a suggestion in
Justice Rutledge's elaborate opinion that, at least where the issue is one
involving the group interest, the bargaining agent may likewise not be
excluded. 9 i
A number of decisions' in recent years have helped to define further
the nature and incidents of the collective bargaining obligation. In
92 Cf. NLRB v. North American Aviation, Incorporated, (C.C.A. 9th, 1943)
136 F. (2d) 898, and Hughes Tool Company v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 5th, 1945) · 147
F. (2d) 69, noted 44 M1c:a;. L. REv. 320 (1945). The board's positioii, as taken in
the Hughes Tool case [56 N.L.R.B. 981 (1944) ], was stated in part as follows:
"We interpret the proviso to Section, 9(a) of the Act to mean that individual
employees and groups of employees are permitted 'to present grievances to their employer' by appearing in behalf of themselves-although not through any labor organization other than the exclusive representative-at every stage of the grievance 'procedure,
but that the exclusive representative is entitled to be present and negotiate at each such
stage concerning the disposition to be made of the grievance. If, at any level of the
established grievance procedure, there is an agreement between the employer, the
exclusive represent~tive, and the individual or group, · disposition of the grievance· is
thereby achieved. Failing agreement of all. three parties, any dissatisfied party may carry
the grievance through subsequent machinery until the established grievance is exhausted." (Id. at 982.)
93 Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 7n, 65 S. Ct. 1282 (1945).
The case involved the question whether individual employees claiming to have a
grievance, were bound by a settlement negotiated by the union, or by an Adjustment
Board award to that effect, rendered in a proceeding to which they were not personally
parties. It was held that they were not bound. The decision had severe repercussions
in the industry, as the carriers, unions and adjustment boards reflected on the implications of the Court's opinion. The boards for ~ time ceased to· operate, because they
could not be sure of their authority to proceed in their usua_l manner without the direct
participation in the proceedings of the individual employees holding the grievances.
These effects are graphically described in the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter,
rendered after reaffirmance of the Court's prior opinion after reargument. ~]gin, Joliet
& Eastern Ry. v. ~urley, (U.S. 1946) 66 S. Ct. 721.
,
9 : "We need not determine in this case whether Congress intended to leave the
·
settlement of grievances altogether to the individual workers, excluding the collective
agent entirely except as they may specifically authorize it to act for them, or intended
it also to have voice in the settlement as representative of the collective interest. Cf.
Matter of Hughes Tool Company, 56 N.L.R.B. 981, modified and enforced, Hughes
Tool Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra. The statute ·does not expressly
exclude grievances from the collective agent's duty to treat or power to submit to the
Board. Both collective and individual interests may be concerned in the settlement
where, as in this case, the dispute concerns all members alike, and settlement hangs
exclusively upon a single common issue or cause of dispute arising from the terms of a
collective agreement••.." Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 at
737, 65 S. Ct. 1282 (1945). And see the footnote material i,::ited to this portion of the
opinion.
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Medo Photo Supply Corporation v. NLRB 95 it was held, in a de<::ision
somewhat inconsistent with the earlier RLA case of Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co. 00 that, once a union has acquired bargaining
rights, the employer is not free to negotiate terms and conditions of .
employment with individual employees or groups, since such matters
must be bargained out with the union. Nor, under the recent May
Department Stores decision, 97 may the employer even proceed, in advance of consultation with the union, to obtain such governmental approval as may be necessary to place in effect a proposed wage increase,
at least where the employer in sense depreciates the union by an impolitic announcement to the employees that he has taken such action.
Two 1944 Supreme Court decisions al'so emphasize the superior
position attached to collective bargaining and the collective agreement
in relation to the individual employment contract. The first, J. I. Case
Company v. NLRB, 08 held that one year individual employment contracts, in existence· when the union was certified, did not excuse the employer from collective bargaining. The Court did not purport to decide
to what extent the individual contracts would be effective after the
making of a collective agreeme~t. But in Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency,9 9 arising under the RLA, it held that
employees were not bound by individually negotiated agreements providing a lower rate of compensation than that fixed by an existing collective agreement. These decisions indicate a considerable maturation
of the concept of collective bargaining since Chief Justice Stone in 1937
in the Virginian Railway case 100 rather clearly indicated that the duty

a

321 U.S. 678, 64 S. Ct. 830 (1944), noted 33 ILL. B. J. 95 (1944).
315 U.S. 386, 62 S. Ct. 659 (1942).
97 May Department Stores Company v. NLRB, (U.S. 1945) C.C.H. LAB. LAW
SERV., 1f 51,217.
98 321 U.S. 332, 64S. Ct. 576.(1944).
99 321 U.S. 342,- 64 S. Ct. 582 (1944).
100 Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 57 S. Ct.
592 ( l 93 7). The Court's opinion stated: "The obligation imposed on the employer
by § 2, Ninth, to treat with the_ true representative of the employees as designated by
the Mediation Board, when, read in the light of the declared purposes of the Act, and
of the provisions of § 2, Third and Fourth, giving to the employees the right tCT organize and bargain collectively through the representative of their own selection, is exclusive. It imposes the affirmative duty to treat only with the true representative, and
hence the negative duty to treat with no other. We think, as the Government concedes
in its brief, that the injunction against petitioner's entering into any contract concerning
rules, rates of pay and working conditions, except with respondent, is designed only to
prevent collective bargaining with anyone purporting to·represent employees, other than
respondent, who has been ascertained to be their true representative. When read in its
context it must be taken to prohibit the negotiation of labor contracts, geneqilly applicable to employees in the mechanical department, with any representative other than
respondent, but not as precluding such individual contracts as petitioner may elect to
make directly with individual employees." Id. at 548-549.
95
96
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to bargain collectively was simply an obligation to deal with the certified union to the exclusion of any other union, but not necessarily to the
exclusion of individual negotiation.
·
One other matter made clear in recent Supreme Court decisions is
that if an employer refuses to deal with a union which has acquired
bargaining rights under a labor relations act, or otherwise violates his
obligations under such act, and the union thereupon suffers a decline
in. membership until it no longer represents the necessary majority, the
duty to bargain still subsists: This is the effect of NLRB v. P. Lorillard Company 101 and Franks Brothers Company v. NLRB. 102 The
theory is that the unfair labor practice may well have contri15uted to the
decline in ·membership. The result is an application of the principle
stated in the Court's opinion in the latter case that "a bargaining relationship once rightfully established must be permitted to exist and function
for a reasonable period in which it can be given a fair chance to succeed." 103 The validity of this general proposition as well as the application in cases of this type seems clear. To this extent the policy
favoring complete freedom in the individual to join any organization of.
his choice, although implying similar freedom to revoke such choice at
any time, is subordinated to achieve the larger purpose of the act, which
is industrial peace and stability.
The initial goal of every labor organization which sets out to organize a group of employees protected by one of the labor relations acts is,
of course, to achieve the status of duly accredited bargaining representative. When two or more unions compete for some or all of such employees, the function of the administr;ttive agency entrusted with the
duty of resolving the representation question becomes highly important.
Wide discretionary powers are conferred on the agencies with respect
to the det:ermination of the appropriate bargaining unit, a determination
which often is critical and may involve the life or death of a particular
union insofar as the plant is concerned.
If a given union has in effect been denied an opportunity to gain a
majority vote because of the agency's definition of the bargaining unit,
its interests have obviously been seriously prejudiced, and it might,
with reason, believe that it should be afforded :in opportunity for
judicial review of the agency's decision. Neither the NLRA nor the
RLA, however, provides expressly for such review, and recent decisions
of the Supreme Court go far in the direction of denying the losing
union an opportunity for review. 104 It may be that review may be ob101314 U.S. 512, 62 S. Ct. 397 (1942). ·
102 321 U.S. 702, 64 S. Ct. 817 (1944).
103 Franks Brothers Company v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 at 705, 64 S. Ct. 817
(1944).
104 In American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 60 S. Ct. 300
( 1940), it was held that a certification by the NLRB was not reviewable by the
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tained by interventon of such union in litigation between the NLRB or,
in the case of the RLA, the winning uni.on and the employer wherein
the obligation to bargain is sought to be enforced, but it seems likely,
in view of the emphasis upon administrative finality of certification
orders in the Switchmen's Union case 105 that intervention, if allowed,
would be fruitless. Moreover, in most.situations employer acquiesence
in the results of the representation proceeding makes this possible
remedy unavailable to the losing union.
·
e. Relation of federal and state legislation. Important questions
have arisen in recent years as to the extent to which the NLRA leaves
tg.e states free to adopt measures designed to restrict, repress or otherwise regulate unions. The states, with their divergent interests and
points of view, are important laboratories for social experimentation.
The question is how far they may go in the :field of labor relations.
The Wagner Act does not by its terms preempt the :field, but it does
grant employees an unqualified right to unionize and bargain collectively, and any state action imposing procedural or substantive limitations on collective bargaining is arguably inconsistent with the paramount policy expressed by Congress.
In 1942 the Supreme Court rather easily, and certainly correctly,
concluded in Allen-Bradley Local No. r r r r v. Wisconsin Employ-.
ment Relations Board 106 that the State of Wisconsin was not precluded
by th,e NLRA from including in its own labor relations act a code of
good conduct applicable to unions. Thus, mass picketing, violence, etc.
could be treated as unfair employee practices, and sanctions provided.
circuit court of appeals under the statutory procedure for review of board orders provided by section IO of the NLRA. In Switchmen's Union of North America v.
National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 64 S. Ct. 95 (1943), it was held that the
federal district court was without power, under the RLA, to review a National
Mediation Board certification in an action brought by a losing union to have the
certification cancelled. The Court was of the opinion that Congress intended that the
question of representation "was to reach its last terminal point when the administrative
finding was made." The Court added this statement, however: "What is open when
a court of equity is asked for its affirmative help by granting a decree for the enforcement of a certificate of the Mediation Board under § 2, Ninth raises questions not now
before us." (Id. at 307.) A similar issue with respect to NLRB certifications was
presented in Inland Empire District Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 65 S. Ct. 1316
(1945). The circuit court of appeals had held that the district court was without jurisdiction. This judgment was affirmed, but the basis of the decision is not entirely clear.
The issue was not 'the merits of the board's decision but, rather, whether it had failed
to accord complainants the "hearing'' which the statute requires. The Court did
proceed to inquire into this matter, and to fi~d that there had been no violation of the
statutory requirements. To this extent a review was provided. See generally Sapiro and
Gilbert, "Judicial Review of N.L.R.B. Certifications by Independent Suits in Equity,"
14 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 312 (1946).
105 Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S.
2-97, 64 S. St. 95 (1943), supra, note 104.
m 315 U.S. 740, 62 S. Ct. 820 (1942).
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Hill v. Florida,1° 1 decided in 1945, presented the question whether the
State of Florida could validly forbid unions and their agents to function
in the state unless- tl).ey respectively filed certain reports and were
licensed. It was held that these measures attempted improperly to
circumscribe the "full freedom" of employees to organize and bargain
collectively under the NLRA and that Congress did not intend to subject this freedom to any such "eroding process."
Both the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. had sought earlier to test
Alabama's "Bradford Act," but their effprts failed of immediate results
because it had not been made clear just how the statute would be
construed by the Alabama courts. 108 A similar result was reached very
recently with respect to a 1944 amendment of the Florida Constitution
purporting, somewhat ambiguously, to outlaw the closed shop. 109 The
ambiguities were such that the federal district court was held to be in
error in considering the question of possible conflict with the NLRA
until the meaning of the amendment has been.made clear.
These decisions, and others reached in the lower federal courts, suggest that, although Congress has not so spoken as to silence the states,
the Supreme Court is ready to scrutinize state labor relations regulations with a watchful eye in order to safeguard the basic principles
declared in the federal legislation. The possibility of conflict of state
legislation with the constitutional right to picket involves, or course,
another and independent basis upon which to hold state regulation of
unionism in check.
f. Fiduciary responsibility of unions. Mention has been made
earlier of the duty imposed on unions and employers not to use closed
shop provisions so as to deprlve employees unfairly of their freedom to
express their preference with respect fo unions. In the Wallace case,110
which involved this principle, Justice Black for the Court observed that
the union, by its selection as bargaining representative, "has become the
agent of all the employees, charged with the responsibility of representing their interests fairly and impartially." m The sanie principle was
appliedin Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroatf, Company 112 and
325 U.S. 538, 65 S. Ct.' 1373 (1945), noted 94 UN1v. PA. L. REv. II4
.
108 Alabama State Federation of Labor, Local Union No. 103 v. McAdory, 325
U.S. 450, 65 S. Ct. 1384 (1945); Congress of Industrial Organizations v. McAdory,
325 U.S. 472, 65 S. Ct. 1395 (1945),
109 American Federation of Labor v. Watson, (U.S. 1946) 66 S. Ct. 761, C.C.H •
LAB. LAW SERV.,
51,226.
110 Wallace Corporation v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 65 S. Ct. 238 (1944). See
supra, note 87.
·
111 Wallace Corporation v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 at 255, 65 S. Ct. 238 (1944).
112 323 U.S. 192, 65 S. Ct. 226 (1944), noted 43 M1cH. L. REv. 983 (1945),
33 ILL. B. J. 239 (1945), 23'TEXAS L. REv. 787 (1945).
107

(1945).
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Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen,1 18
decided on the same day as the Wallace case, in which it was held that
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, which was
exclusive bargaining representative for the craft of firemen and, as such,
statutory representative of negro firemen who were not eligible to union
membership, had unlawfully discriminated against such firemen in
negotiating terms and conditions of employment.
These decisions were based on the proposition that Congress in
granting the bargaining agent the exclusive right to represent. all employees in the bargaining unit, whether or not members of the union,
must have intended that this power be exercised with due regard for
the interests of all elements of the group represented. 114 The principle is completely sound, and is really but an application of concepts
of fiduciary responsibility well .established in other areas of the law.
The administration of the rule, however, presents difficult problems for
the employer. He must perforce deal with the accredited union. He
must now have in mind that the agreement which he has made with the
union, and which he perhaps had to make because of union pressure,
may be held to involve discrimination against minority groups with resulting legal liability.115
323 U.S. 210, 65 S. Ct. 235 (1944).
The Court analogized the status of the union to that of the legislature. "We
think that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory representative of a craft
at least as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the members of the craft as
the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of
those for whom it legislates. Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative
with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents, .•• but it has also imposed on the representative a corresponding duty. We hold that the language of the Act to which we have
referred, read in the light of- the purposes of the Act, expresses the aim of Congress to
impose on the bargaining representative of a craft or class of employees the duty to
exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against them." 323 U.S. 192 at 202-203, 65 S. Ct. 226
(1944).
.
,
115 It might seem that race discrimination would be fairly obvious whenever it
rears its head. But for southern employers, and others who employ substantial amounts
of negro labor, the problem is far from simple. Does the principle declared by the
Court mean that every collective agreement made by such an employer must, both on
its face and in its administration, provide for absolute equality of treatment regardless
of race? Is a contract, on its face non-discriminatory, subject to attack, for example,
if it appears in any plant that negroes are for the most part employed in practice in
a "black gang," at a lower rate of pay than white unskilled beginners, that very few
negroes hold higher rated jobs, and that even these are segregated into what seems to be.
a negro department? Or, in view of the "negro problem," is a different concept of
"fair treatment" possible for labor relations act and collective bargaining purposes than
that which is embodied in a literal interpretation of the requirements of the various fair
employment statutes and the principles declared during the war by 'the Fair Employment Practices Commission of the federal government?
118

114
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g. Miscellaneous matters. A-n interesting procedural question involving the National Railryad Adjustment Board has had recent
judicial attention. This agency, under the RLA, was created with jurisdiction to decide "grievances" arising under railway labor agreements.
A problem of considerable importance is whether resort to this agency
is entirely optional, or whether a dispute arising under an agreement, if
not settled, must be presented to the board before judicial proceedings
may be instituted.
In Moore v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. 116 the Supreme Court
without consideration of the important principles of administrative law
involved, or the rather persuasive precedents which could have been
cited from other areas of the law,117 held that prior resort to the board
was not required before an employee could bring suit to ob~ain redress
for a wrongful discharge. It is difficult to reconcile thil:l decision with
the Court's 1946 decision in Order of Ra.ilway Conductors of America
v. Pilney and Gardner 118 in which it was held that a federal district
court should not, in the course of a reorganization proceeding, adjudicate a jurisdictional dispute involving the interpretation of two collective agreements, since under the RLA matters of contract interpretation
are referrable
to the Adjustment Board, an agency· "peculiarly com,
The opinion of the Court in the Steele case does not appear to admit of,much
qualification with respect to the matter of race. "Variations in the terms of the contract based on differences relevant to the authorized purposes of the contract in conditions to which they are to be applied, such as differences in seniority, the type 9f
work performed, the competence and skill with which it is performed, are within the
scope of the bargaining representation of a craft, all of whose members are not identical
in their interest or, merit. . . • Without attempting to mark the allowable limits of
differences in the terms of contracts based on difference of conditions to which they
apply, i,t is enough for present purposes to say that the statutory power to represent a
craft and to make contracts as to wages, hours and working conditions does not include
the authority to make among members of the craft discriminations not based on such
relevant differences. Here the discriminations based on race alorie are obviously
irrelevant and invidious. Congress plainly did not undertake to authorize the bargaining representative i:o make such discriminations." Steele v. L. & N, R.R. Co., 323
U.S. 192 at 203, 65 S. Ct. 226 (1944);
··
It seems obvious that the test will not be met by showing simply that the contract,
itself, contains no discriminatory provisions: the administration of the agreement will
certainly be equally important. The question as to union liability will be whether the
union either initiates, condones, or conspires to bring about, a discriminatory admini~
tratioi:1 of any of the provisions of the agreement. If the employer practices any such
discrimination, either in making or administering the agreement, he faces the prospect
of unfair labor practice charges or their equivalent.
116 312 U.S. 630, 61 S. Ct. 754 (1941).
.
117 See, for example, Texas & Pacific Railway v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204
U.S. 426, 27 S. Ct. 350 (1907), and United States Navigation Co., Inc. v. Cunard
Steamship Co., Ltd., 284·U.S. 474, 52 S. Ct: 247 (1932).
;118 66 S. Ct. 322 (U.S. 1946).

CoMMENTS

II29

petent to handle the basic question here involved." The Court1s
opinion, unaccountably, made no mention at all of the Moore case.
There is every reason why the doctrine of prior resort should be
applied in this field, and it is to be hoped that the Court will, at an early
date, repudiate its earfier decision and make it clear that the principles
announced in the Pitney case will not be limited in application to the
type of situation there presented. This will be especially important if
legislation should be enacted, as now proposed, providing for special
agencies to settle grievances in other industries.119
In conformance with its current attitude of approbation of the ad-:
ministrative process, the Supreme Court has been inclined to leave the
labor relations agencies substantially free of judicial restraint, especially
in respect of fact finding and the shaping of remedies. Evidence of this
has already been noted in connection with the problem of judicial
review of certification proceedings. It is the rare case under the NLRA
which finds the Supreme Court ( and, as a consequence, the circuit
courts) ready to disagree with the NLRB's findings of fact, or with its
conclusions as to the type of affirmative order to be directed against an
employer found guilty of unfair labor practices. This makes the board,
which is also prosecutor, substantially the final judge of the validity
of its own case against the employer.
In the board's early years it was constantly being charged with
unfairness and bias, and there was a widespread demand that its judicial and prosecuting functions be separated. In more recent years
there has been a noticeable subsidence of interest in this problem, attributable, perhaps, to a combination of circumstances-changes in
board membership and a more careful administration of the act, a
greater degree of employer acceptance of the basic principles declared
in the act, perhaps even a growing acceptance of the idea that administration of'law in specialized areas by administrative agencies rather than
courts is essential whether we like it or not. The cynic might discount
all of this and simply conclude that the employer has had to. give up
his overt opposition in the face of too many political obstacles.

D. Other Areas of Labor Law
Space does not permit treatment at this time of recent developments
in other areas of labor law, important as they may be. The Fair Labor
Standards Act,120 for example, has occnpied perhaps more than its fair
share of the attention of the courts in recent years. A classification of
the cases would probably show that questions of scope and coverage
have appeared in greatest number, -although some very interesting and
119

See the Ball-Burton-Hatch Bill, S. II71, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (1946).

120

52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 201 et seq.
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important questions of construction of the act have also been presented.
As in the case of the labor relations acts the tendency has been to give
the FLSA a very broad application in order to achieve the '"broad
humanitarian purposes" of the act.
The war emergency brought in its wake tremendous problems of
mobilization of all the resources of the nation, including manpower: for
essential production. Labor problems, already important on the national scene, became of critical importance. The reader is no doubt
generally familiar with the measures taken by the government to provide for the equitable adjustment of labor disputes, th:e elimination
· of strikes and other forms of work stoppage and the control of
wage levels. The program was based on an early so-called "agreement" on the part of labor, industry and the government that, for the
duration, the use of the strike should be suspended, and, in lieu thereof,
disputes should be settled on their merits. Departing from the pattern
established by President Wilson in the-first World War, however, the
parties did not proceed to agree on a set of principles to be applied in
the settlement of disputes.121 President Roosevelt's War Labor Board,
therefore, had to devise its own standards with but little guidance even
from the President's various executive orders and with no help from
Congress.
1
During the war period a tremendous_ number of cases was decided
by the National War Labor Board, in the course of which many interesting "patterns" of decision came to be established, all by an agency
whose decisions were held to be merely "advisory" but which, with the
backing of executive sanctions at least as efficacious as ordinary judicial
remedies, sµcceeded in obtaining general observance of its "directive
orders." Perhaps the most interesting questions with respect fo the
whole program at this point are whether the decisional patterns developed by the board which now permeate the fabric of labor relations
will continue to be accepted as standards, and whether the war time
experience with compulsory settlement of labor disputes will serve to
strengthen the demand for the elimination of labor warfare in peacetime and to suggest a procedure for achieving such objective.
Anything approaching a complete survey of labor law developments in recent years woJ1ld have to cover, in addition to the foregoing,
121 For a summary of the principles and policies agreed upon for World War I see
the Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, pp. 102-103, to which reference is
made in Smith, "The Evolution of the 'Duty to Bargain' Concept in American Law,"
39 MICH. L. REv. 1065, 1068 (1941)'.. On the operation of the World War II
Board see the symposium in 16 RocKY MT. L. REv. 93 et seq. (1944); Haber,
"Aspects of Wage Stabilization by the National War Labor Board," 43 MICH. L. REv.
1007 (1945); and Gordon, "Retroactivity of National War Labor· Board Awards,"
45 CoL. L. REv. 889 (1945).
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such matters as the interpretation and application of the federal and
state anti;injunction statutes and of other kinds of state and federal
legislation, and trends in the· case law with respect to union activities.
The collective agreement would merit treatment, not only as regards
such strictly legal problems as enforceability, but, more important, with
relation to developments in its structure and content as the basic instrumentality for adjusting labor relations. It will be necessary to defer
these matters al~ng with others until another time.
Labor relations has always been a dynamic subject, and today it
is more so than ever. Attesting to this fact is the current struggle-in
Congress over proposals to amend and supplement the Wagner Act,
the Norris Act and the Sherman Act. Opinion is sharply divided between the "solve the problem by legislation" group, who would have
a more or less complete federal labor relations code, and the "work
it out slowly and by mutual understanding" group, who, while desiring
retention of present legislative grants to unions, do not favor the imposition of statutory curbs on improper union conduct. There are some
who stand somewhere between these two extremes, who recognize the
problem as a major one in human relations, and hence as probably
beyond complete solution by legislation, but who feel that no group
of persons in this country shquld be above amenability to standards of
conduct set in the interests of all the people, and that the time has come
when some such standards, dictated by major economic and other policy
considerations, should be set. These persons believe that what is needed
is not so much a federal code to police strikes, picketing, etc., as a firm
stand with respect to union practices which do positive economic harm
and with respect to union responsibilities to their members, to persons
outside the union but in the bargaining group, and to employers with
whom agreements have been made.
This nation is now clearly committed to "industrial democracy" as
represented by strong, indepenqent unionism, and managements will do
well to accept th.is fact and determine their labor relations policies accordingly. Their problem henceforth, as representatives of stockholders
and as proponents of our economic system, is to bend every effort to accommodate unionism to the economic welfare. Reciprocity from union
leaders must eventually be achieved, but may be slow in coming.
Meanwhile, the surpassing importance of labor relations in industrial
operations and to the country should raise the subject to first rank in
the thinking and acting of business executives. But this is not "labor
law."
Russell A. Smith t
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